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Abstract
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in the world, with negative
effects on productivity, proﬁtability, economic growth, and development. The social responsibility role of
public companies in contributing towards reducing the negative effects of HIV/AIDS is priceless. This
paper investigates the impact of corporate governance (CG) on social and environmental accounting (SEA)
with speciﬁc focus on corporate health accounting (CHA) and, consequently, examines whether CG can
moderate the link betweenCHA andﬁrm value (FV), with particular focus onHIV/AIDS disclosures. First,
employing one of the most extensive data on CG, CHA, and FV from a sample of listed SSA companies to
date, our results suggest that companies that are better-governed tend to engage in increased CHA
disclosures. Second, we ﬁnd that the combined effects of CG and CHA on FV are stronger than CHA
alone, meaning that the quality of ﬁrm-level CG moderates the link between CHA and FV. Our
econometric speciﬁcations are robust to different traditional ﬁrm-level characteristics, endogeneities, and
alternative CG (corporate board and shareholding structure variables), FV, and CHA proxies. We interpret
our ﬁndings within a framework that attempts to combine Suchman's (1995) legitimacy theoretical
perspective with Ashforth and Gibbs' (1990) substantive and symbolic legitimacy management strategies.
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In this paper, we respond to recent calls and debates within the broader social and
environmental accounting (SEA) literature (e.g., Barbu, Dumontier, Feleagă, & Feleagă,
2014a, 2014b; Crifo & Forget, 2015; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014; Van Cranenburgh &
Arenas, 2014; Wilkins, 2014) to make two new contributions to the extant literature by:
(i) assessing the impact of corporate governance (CG) on corporate health accounting
(CHA),1 and (ii) examining the extent to which CG can moderate the link between CHA
and firm value (FV), with particular focus on HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The
HIV/AIDS epidemic has been widely acknowledged as one of the world's most serious
health crises of this century (Dickinson, 2004; Dickinson & Stevens, 2005; Du Bruyn &
Venter, 2006; Fig, 2005; Lawrence & Samkin, 2005; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013; UNAIDS,
2014). At the extreme, the disease has reduced average life expectancy in SSA countries by
about 20 to 30 years (Mahajan, Colvin, Rudatsikira, & Ettl, 2007; UNAIDS, 2014; Visser,
2002).More importantly, however, is that HIV/AIDS has had adverse effects on both national
and corporate productivity and profitability in SSA countries (Lawrence & Samkin, 2005;
Machuki & Oketch, 2013; Van Cranenburgh, Liket, & Roome, 2013). At the national level,
negative effects of the decreasing number of active labor force (Rahaman, Neu, & Everett,
2010; Saguier, 2007), such as shrinking real GDP and tax revenues with increasing healthcare
costs (Fig, 2005; Du Bruyn, 2008; UNAIDS, 2014), and loss of foreign direct investments
due to high costs of doing business (Barako, Taplin, & Brown, 2010; Rampersad, 2010), are
easily observable in SSA countries. At the corporate level, higher absenteeism, shortages of
skilled employees, and the higher human resource management costs often associated with
HIV/AIDS can have a direct negative effect on FV (Bird, 2009; Dawkins & Ngunjiri, 2008;
Du Bruyn, 2008; Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Rein & Stott, 2009; Van Cranenburgh &
Arenas, 2014). However, of the estimated 33 million people currently living with HIV/AIDS
in the world, about 23 million (about 70%) of them live in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
(Rampersad, 2010, p. 2269; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013, p. 98; Whellams, 2008).
At the same time and similar to other countries around the world, a number of SSA
countries have pursued voluntary (‘comply or explain’) CG and CHA policy reforms
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), albeit at different time periods ranging from 1994
in South Africa to 2010 in Ghana. However, due to major socio-economic challenges
(e.g., widespread poverty and high unemployment), CG reforms that have been embarked
upon in SSA nations have placed particular importance on improving CG practices for all
corporate stakeholders (i.e., both shareholders and other stakeholders) (Mangena &
Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012).
For example, the King Reports on Corporate Governance (CG) (King Committee, 1994,
2002, 2010) of South Africa, as well as those relating to Ghana (Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC], Ghana, 2010), Kenya (Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust
[PSCGT], 2002), and Nigeria (Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], Nigeria, 2003)
are inherently inclusive in orientation. However, despite pursuing inclusive CG reforms,1 As ‘CHA’ is a subset of the broader ‘SEA’ literature, interchangeability between the use of the term ‘SEA’ and
‘CHA’ is assumed throughout this study.
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leadership and policies, corruption, political indifference, and cynicism on the part of SSA
national politicians and governments (Barako et al., 2010; Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005;
Mahajan et al., 2007; Rampersad, 2010). Thus, the role of large public corporations in
combating the HIV/AIDS menace in SSA is invaluable. As will be discussed further, one
credible way by which corporations can demonstrate their commitment towards addressing
the HIV/AIDS challenge is to voluntarily adopt the 2003 Global Reporting Initiative's
(GRI's) reporting guidance on HIV/AIDS and disclose their activities aimed at addressing the
HIV/AIDS menace (Dickinson & Stevens, 2005; Fig, 2005; Rampersad, 2010; Soobaroyen
& Ntim, 2013).
Meanwhile, some previous studies have assessed the impact of CG on FV (Beiner,
Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick,
2003; Henry, 2008; Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, 2013; Renders, Gaeremynck, &
Sercu, 2010). Others have investigated the connections among traditional SEA practices, CG,
and FV (Cai, Jo, & Pan, 2012; Dam&Scholtens, 2012; Fifka, 2013; Harjoto& Jo, 2011; Jo&
Harjoto, 2011, 2012; McGuire, Sundregen, & Schneeweis, 1988; Michelon & Parbonetti,
2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b). In contrast, previous research examining the
connection between CG and CHA practices relating to a major global health crisis, e.g.,
Alzheimer's, cancer, dementia, Ebola, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, (Flanagan &
Whiteman, 2007; Machuki & Oketch, 2013; Rein & Stott, 2009; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013;
Vass, 2008) and/or how a corporation's internal CG structure might potentially moderate the
link between CHA and FV (Barako & Brown, 2008; Barako et al., 2010; Rampersad, 2010),
is very rare. Hence, this study distinctively examines the crucial policy questions of why and
how public corporations' governance arrangements might influence their CHA disclosures,
and consequently, investigates why and how the link between CHA and FV might be
moderated by CG in SSA countries.
Theoretically, and although a CHA agenda may be embarked upon for a variety of
important reasons (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Granapathi, 2007; Friedman, 1970;
McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Orlitzky, Siegel,
& Waldman, 2011), demonstrating the legitimate right of a corporation to exist to its various
constituents remains prominent (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Deegan, 2002; Gray, Kouhy, &
Lavers, 1995; Parker, 2005). In this case, Suchman (1995) suggests that legitimacy is a critical
resource that all corporations depend on for their existence, whereas Ashforth and Gibbs
(1990) indicate that corporations will often adopt both substantive and symbolic management
strategies to gain (extend), maintain, and repair (defend) it. We, therefore, rely on legitimacy
theory as the central reason underlying why corporations and managers may voluntarily
engage in and disclose their CHA activities. First, exhibiting greater commitment to CHA via
high CHA disclosures can enhance managers' legitimacy (right to manage corporate
resources) by improving the flow of information between company executives and
stakeholders (Jensen, 1993, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and thus minimizing agency
conflicts and improving FV. Second, prior studies indicate that engaging in greater CHA
practices can help bring harmony between corporate goals/norms and those of the larger
society (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Elkington, 2006; Mackenzie, 2007; Lattermann,
Fetscherin, Alon, Li, & Schneider, 2009; Scott, 1987) by legitimizing company operations
and improving firm reputation and image. Third, it has been suggested that committing to
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stakeholders of corporations, such as labor unions, shareholders, and national governments
(Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995), who are critical in
terms of the ability of the corporation to run profitable and sustainable operations (Chen &
Roberts, 2010). Fourth, other studies indicate that showing greater commitment to CHA
through increased CHA disclosures can facilitate access to crucial resources, such as capital
and business contracts by minimizing health, safety, and political costs through improved
firm reputation, legitimacy, and goodwill (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978).
Consequently, the extant literature has explored the determinants of, and motivations for,
corporate commitment to SEA practices (Barbu et al., 2014a; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008;
Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Campbell, Craven, & Shrives, 2003; Campbell, Moore, &
Shrives, 2006; Deegan, 2002; Fifka, 2013; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Gray et al., 1995; Islam
& Deegan, 2008; Newson & Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005; Roberts, 1992; Reverte, 2009;
Unerman, 2000). However, the current literature seems to have a number of weaknesses.
First, the prior literature has generally analyzed how traditional company-specific features
(e.g., industry, growth, and size) determine SEA practices (Adams, 2002; Deegan & Gordon,
1996; Fifka, 2013; Gamble, Hsu, Jackson, & Tollerson, 1996; Williams, 1999; ), as well as
the financial effects of engaging in SEA practices (Bird, Hall, Momente, & Reggiani, 2007;
Callado-Munoz & Ultrero-Gonzalez, 2011). In contrast, existing research that examines the
connection between internal governance structures and SEA practices is generally limited
(Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012) and acutely so in
emerging countries (Barako & Brown, 2008; Jamali, Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008). Second,
and more importantly, the limited prior studies that explicitly investigate the link between CG
and SEA practices have also focused primarily on traditional SEA practices to the neglect of
social responsibilities relating to the need to address major global corporate health crises
(i.e., CHA) (Cai et al., 2012; Fifka, 2013; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo&Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Dam
& Scholtens, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b).
Finally, and with specific respect to existing HIV/AIDS studies, they are mainly normative
instead of empirical in orientation (Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005; Saguier, 2007; Whellams,
2008), descriptive/qualitative instead of quantitative in nature (Dawkins & Ngunjiri, 2008;
Rahaman et al., 2010), one-year cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data analyses (Barako
&Brown, 2008; Barako et al., 2010), and single-country instead of cross-country focused (Du
Bruyn, 2008; Du Bruyn & Venter, 2006; Lawrence & Samkin, 2005; Soobaroyen & Ntim,
2013). Arguably, these weaknesses within the extant literature limit current international
understanding of why and how a corporation's internal CG arrangements might enhance or
hinder its CHA orientation, and whether CG can moderate the CHA–FV nexus (e.g., Barbu
et al., 2014a, 2014b; Crifo & Forget, 2015; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014; Wilkins, 2014).
Thus, this study seeks to build on, as well as make a number of new contributions to, the
existing international CG, CHA, and FV research by addressing the limitations of prior
studies. First, we examine how and why a company's internal governance mechanisms
may determine its CHA practices in SSA countries. Specifically, employing a composite
CG index, we investigate whether companies with better governance arrangements tend to
demonstrate greater commitment towards CHA through increased CHA disclosures. This
is distinct from most previous evidence, which examines the link between traditional
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theoretical and empirical evidence, which suggests that firm-level decisions, such as the
extent of SEA engagement, are often a function of CG (Elkington, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke,
2005; Jo & Harjoto, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a,
2013b). This stems from the suggestion (Beekes & Brown, 2006; Mallin, 2002) that in a
competitive but imperfect information market, well-governed firms may be able to
distinguish themselves by sending clear signals to the market about their better internal CG
credentials. Thus, engaging in high CHA disclosures may be one way by which well-
governed firms can distinguish themselves from their poorly-governed counterparts.
Second, a large number of studies that have investigated the association between SEA
practices and FV report mixed findings (Becchetti & Ciciretti, 2009; Dam & Scholtens,
2012; Fifka, 2013; Jo & Harjoto, 2012; Lo & Sheu, 2007; Mahoney & Roberts, 2007;
McGuire et al., 1988). The mixed findings of prior research has been attributed mainly to
methodological limitations and potential endogeneity problems (McWilliams & Siegel,
2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003, 2011), but recent evidence that sufficiently addresses such
problems still generally reports similar conflicting findings (Scholtens, 2007, 2008;
Nelling & Webb, 2009). However, past studies suggest that SEA engagement is often
decided by corporate boards and senior executives (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Michelon &
Parbonetti, 2012). Therefore, our prediction is that the association between SEA practices
and FV may be moderated by the quality of internal CG arrangements. This conjecture is
also based on emerging theoretical literature and the findings of previous studies indicating
that while the stock market values both CG and SEA practices, CG practices are priced
higher in comparison to SEA practices (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Cai et al., 2012;
Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Starks, 2009). Thus, the theoretical and empirical
implication is that the SEA–FV nexus may be enhanced when SEA is combined with CG
than SEA alone (Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). However,
existing studies examining the effect of SEA on FV have crucially ignored the potential
moderating role that CG can have on the SEA–FV association. Hence, this study
contributes to the extant research by distinctively investigating the moderating effect of CG on
the relationship between CHA and FV—an extension to prior studies that have examined the
link between traditional SEA practices (i.e., general social and environmental responsibilities)
and FV (Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo &
Harjoto, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b).
Our findings are two-fold. First, using one of the largest datasets on CG, CHA, and FV to
date on large SSA-listed firms, our results suggest that firms with good CG arrangements tend
to show greater commitment to CHA activities through increased CHA disclosures. Second,
our results indicate that the positive impact of CHA on FV when combined with CG is
stronger than CHA on its own, meaning that the quality of firm-level CG has a positive
moderating effect on the CHA–FV nexus. Overall, our econometric specifications are robust
to different kinds of endogeneity problems, as well as alternative CG, CHA, and FV proxies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses HIV/AIDS, CG, CHA
policy reforms and the SSA corporate setting. Section 3 outlines the legitimacy theoretical
framework for CHA disclosures. Section 4 reviews the CHA, CG, and FV literature.
Section 5 presents the research design. Section 6 reports the empirical analyses, results, and
discussion, while Section 7 contains a brief summary and conclusion.
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HIV/AIDS is currently among the globe's biggest health catastrophes (Dickinson, 2004;
Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013). Across the globe, prevalence rate is on the increase, and its
negative effects on corporate and national productivity are increasingly becoming more
visible (Barako et al., 2010; Du Bruyn, 2008; Vass, 2008). However, and since high levels
of poverty and migration contribute to the degree of infection (Dickinson, 2004; Fig,
2005), the disease is apparently more prevalent in developing countries (Barac & Otter,
2001; Mahajan et al., 2007). Of the globe's affected poor sub-continents, SSA occupies the
epicenter of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Dickinson, 2004; Rampersad, 2010). For example,
available figures indicate that approximately 33 million individuals are infected with the
AIDS virus globally, and close to 23 million (i.e., about 70%) are SSA nationals (Rampersad,
2010, p. 2269; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013, p. 98). For example, an estimated 6 million of the
49 million (i.e., over 12%) South Africans are infected with the virus (Dickinson & Stevens,
2005; Lawrence & Samkin, 2005; UNAIDS, 2014). Similarly high levels of prevalence rate
have been reported for most SSA countries, such as Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Namibia, Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (UNAIDS, 2014).
At the extreme, the disease has reduced average life expectancy in SSA countries by about
20 to 30 years (UNAIDS, 2014). More importantly, however, is that HIV/AIDS has had
adverse effects on both national and corporate productivity and profitability in SSA countries
(Lawrence & Samkin, 2005). For instance, decreasing number of active labor force (Barako
et al., 2010), shrinking real GDP and tax revenues, but increasing healthcare costs (Fig, 2005;
DuBruyn, 2008; UNAIDS, 2014) and the loss of direct foreign investments due to high costs of
doing business (Barako et al., 2010; Rampersad, 2010), are easily observable in SSA countries.
Corporations operating in SSA countries have also been affected negatively in a number of
ways by the AIDS pandemic (Rampersad, 2010; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013). These include
higher absenteeism, increased employee turnover, low staff morale and productivity, shortage
of skilled expertise, and increased human resource management costs relating to recruitment,
training, funeral, and payment of pension/next-of-kin benefits (Fig, 2005; Mahajan et al.,
2007). The above negative consequences appear to have not only impaired the competitiveness
of SSA corporations, but also impacted negatively on their capacity to maintain long-term
profitable and sustainable operations (Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005; Rampersad, 2010).
Observably, efforts at addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic have also been hampered by
lack of decisive leadership and policies, corruption, political indifference, and cynicism on
the part of SSA national politicians and governments (Barako et al., 2010; Dickinson,
2004; Fig, 2005; Mahajan et al., 2007; Rampersad, 2010). In South Africa, for example,
political leaders have not only publicly and persistently challenged the scientific causes of
HIV/AIDS (e.g., by suggesting that HIV/AIDS is caused by poverty rather than its
identified major cause of having unprotected sex), but also raised important doubts with respect
to the efficacy of anti-retroviral drugs, and thus have explicitly refused to administer such drugs
toHIV/AIDS patients (e.g., Dickinson&Stevens, 2005; Soobaroyen&Ntim, 2013). Similarly,
in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, corruption and poor
administrative practices have undermined HIV/AIDS policy implementation, such as public
education, awareness, and prevention campaigns (Barako et al., 2010; Mahajan et al., 2007;
Rahaman et al., 2010; Vass, 2008).
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governments coupled with the direct negative implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic for
corporate sustainability should give corporations, especially large ones operating in SSA
countries, a greater impetus to pursue a more socially responsible agenda with regard to
how they report their commitments towards addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. One
credible way by which corporations can demonstrate their commitment towards addressing
the HIV/AIDS challenge is to adopt the 2003 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s reporting
guidance on HIV/AIDS (Dickinson, 2004; Dickinson & Stevens, 2005; Fig, 2005; Lawrence
& Samkin, 2005; Rampersad, 2010; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013). The GRI's framework,
which was developed and tested in South Africa, contains 16 ‘performance indicators'
covering four broad areas of sustainable HIV/AIDS policy development and implementation:
(i) good governance; (ii) measuring, monitoring, and evaluation; (iii) workplace conditions
and HIV/AIDS management; and (iv) depth, quality, and sustainability of programs.
Coincidentally, and similar to European and American countries, a number of SSA
countries have pursued voluntary (‘comply or explain’) CG and CHA policy reforms
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), albeit at different time periods, ranging from as early as
1994 for South Africa to as late as 2010 for Ghana. However, due to major socio-economic
challenges (e.g., widespread poverty and high unemployment), CG reforms that have been
embarked upon in SSA nations have placed particular importance on improving CG practices
for all corporate stakeholders (i.e., both shareholders and other stakeholders) (Mangena &
Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt and Thomas, 2012).
For example, the King Reports on CG (King Committee, 1994, 2002, 2010) of South Africa,
which are also used in other SSA countries such as Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, are
inherently inclusive in orientation. The ‘inclusive’ CG framework explicitly mandates
companies to not only pursue sound financial management, but also directly address a
number of identified concerns of other corporate stakeholders, such as those regarding
affirmative action, environment, health, HIV/AIDS,2 safety, and social investment (King
Committee, 1994, 2002, 2010). Similar to South Africa, CG reforms that have been pursued
in other SSA countries such as Ghana (SEC, Ghana, 2010), Kenya (PSCGT, 2002), and
Nigeria (SEC, Nigeria, 2003) have observably been generally inclusive in nature.
In addition to pursuing ‘inclusive’ CG reforms (“combined CG and CHA reforms”), the
SSA corporate context is characterized by concentrated ownership structures (Mangena &
Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt and Thomas,
2012). In South Africa, ownership concentration arises primarily from the development of
corporate pyramids and cross ownerships (King Committee, 2002). In other SSA countries,
such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, ownership concentration takes the form of
strategic government holdings, often leading to cronyism, favoritism, and tribalism in
board appointments. Further, activism by shareholders is noticeably not strong, and the
record is observably poor when it comes to the implementation and enforcement of
company rules, often resulting in ineffective top executive talent (labor), corporate control,
capital, product and service markets (King Committee, 2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a,2 Noticeably, the King Reports encourage ﬁrms to voluntary comply with the GRI's (2003) guidance on
HIV/AIDS.
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reforms in SSA countries can be effective in improving CG and CHA disclosures, and thus,
it constitutes an ideal research setting in which the connections among CG, CHA, and FV
can be examined. Hence, the central aim of this study is to examine the impact of CG
on CHA, and consequently, to ascertain whether the CHA–FV nexus can be moderated by
CG.
3. A legitimacy theoretical framework for CHA disclosures
Although a number of theories (e.g., agency, institutional, stakeholder, and resource
dependence theories) have been employed by previous studies in explaining why
corporations may voluntarily engage in CHA activities, legitimacy theory remains the
dominant one (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012a; Cho,
Michelon, & Patten, 2012b; Deegan, 2002; Gray et al., 1995; Parker, 2005; Reverte, 2009),
and therefore the legitimacy theory as proposed by Suchman (1995) is combined with
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) substantive and symbolic management in our interpretation of
our findings. Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” In this case,
legitimacy theory indicates that a corporation's right to exist becomes legitimized
(i.e., gain credibility, stability, and continuity by seeking active and/or passive support) if
its value system is in congruence with the value system (i.e., norms, beliefs, definitions,
and rules) of the larger society, but it becomes endangered when there is actual or
perceived differences between the corporate and societal value systems. Suchman (1995)
thus presents legitimacy as a strategic resource that every organization needs not only in
order to survive but also to gain competitive advantage by winning the support of its
powerful stakeholders (e.g., creditors, customers, national governments, shareholders, and
employees/unions).
Suchman (1995, p. 577) outlines three different discernible types of legitimacy
(i.e., pragmatic, moral and cognitive), all of which operate under the common assumption
that corporate activities “are desirable, proper, or appropriate within socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions,” albeit with somewhat different behavioral
dynamics. Briefly, Suchman (1995) explains that pragmatic legitimacy is where organizations
receive support (‘legitimacy’) for their activities by offering something to their stakeholders
(‘quid-pro-quo’) that may involve direct contributions, e.g., social or financial support
(exchange legitimacy); positions of influence, e.g., board appointment s(influence
legitimacy); or by displaying a positive disposition, e.g., demonstrating to constituents that
it is a caring, trustworthy, honest, and decent organization towards stakeholders (dispositional
legitimacy). Unlike pragmatic legitimacy, in which an organization provides something
(literally a ‘bribe’) to its stakeholders, especially the powerful ones (e.g., creditors, customers,
national governments, shareholders, and employees/unions), in direct exchange for their
support, moral legitimacy is not based on assessing the direct benefits that organizational
stakeholders will receive, but their normative judgment on whether an organization's
activities, actions, inactions, values, beliefs, and norms are right or wrong. This may involve
judgments by stakeholders about whether an organization's outputs and consequences
163Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216(consequential legitimacy), techniques and procedures (procedural legitimacy), categories
and structures (structural legitimacy), and leaders and representatives actions (personal
legitimacy) are in congruence (right) with those of the larger society or not (wrong). Finally,
cognitive legitimacy does not rest on the pursuance of stakeholders' self-interests (pragmatic
legitimacy) or positive/negative self-evaluation (moral legitimacy), but simply on cognition
(learning), often not only involving the ability of a stakeholder to understand (comprehen-
sibility legitimacy) the activities and actions of an organization, but also the acceptance
that the existence of an organization is inevitable/unavoidable (taken-for-granted legitimacy)
and thus, by extension, the organization's existence and activities are proper/legitimate.
Suchman (1995) suggests that corporations usually employ a number of strategies in order to:
(i) gain (e.g., by conforming, selecting, and manipulating the environment); (ii) maintain
(e.g., by perceiving or pre-empting future changes and protecting past achievements); and
(iii) repair (e.g., by offering normalized accounts, restructuring, and not ‘panicking’) their
legitimacy.
Whereas Suchman (1995) argues that depending upon the threat to or the state of an
organization's legitimacy, it may employ a mixture of strategies in order to gain, maintain,
and repair its legitimacy, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) have perfectly classified such
legitimacy-seeking strategies broadly into two types: (i) substantive (‘efficiency’) and
(ii) symbolic (‘impression’) management. Substantive management “involves real, material
change in organizational goals, structures, and processes or socially institutionalized
practices” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 178). Substantive management, therefore, involves:
(i) meeting the actual performance expectations of its powerful stakeholders (e.g., providing a
good return on equity to shareholders, producing safe and high-quality products at affordable
prices, and offering equitable pay and job security for employees); (ii) using coercive
isomorphism (e.g., by conforming to the values, norms, and expectations of its stakeholders,
such as voluntarily complying with a CG or CHA code such as the GRI's HIV/AIDS
guidance); (iii) altering resource dependencies upon its influential stakeholders (e.g., by
developing long-term contracts and alternative supplier or customer base); (iv) altering
socially institutionalized practices into conformity with its ends or means (e.g., by engaging in
intensive lobbying against legislation, litigating against and negotiating with regulators, and
building a credible scientific knowledge base on which negative claims can be refuted
through commissioning and funding of scientific research).
By contrast, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 180) suggest that symbolic management
means that “Rather than actually change its ways, the organization might simply portray – or
symbolically manage – them so as to appear consistent with social values and expectations.”
Symbolic management, thus, consists of: (i) merely espousing socially acceptable goals while
actually pursuing less acceptable ones (e.g., by formulating and publicizing ethics policies,
but not monitoring actual compliance and enforcement); (ii) denial and concealment (e.g., by
suppressing information regarding activities or outcomes likely to undermine legitimacy);
(iii) redefining means and ends (e.g., by retrospectively reframing an issue in terms of other
values instead of the original values – means and ends – that are seen as legitimate);
(iv) offering accounts (e.g., by offering excuses, justifications, and explanations aimed at
minimizing liability and guilt, including attribution to external forces); (v) offering apologies
[(e.g., by at least acknowledging some level of partial responsibility for a negative incident
and expression of regret, often aimed at (a) conveying management's concerns regarding the
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(c) reaffirming to stakeholders that management is in control and serious in addressing
the negative incident, and (d) maintaining some level of managerial credibility)]; and
(vi) ceremonial conformity (e.g., by adopting highly visible practices that are in line with
social expectations, while leaving the key organizational structure intact. For example, setting
up a health and safety committee to study industrial accidents to merely create the impression
that management cares about reducing employee fatalities, but no improvements are made to
safety gadgets, tools, and procedures). Similar to Suchman (1995), Ashforth and Gibbs
(1990) suggest that organizations may select and implement a mixture of these strategies to
extend (gain), maintain, and defend (repair) their legitimacy, and they may alter their strategy
depending on the objective or the severity of the legitimacy threat (high or low) and level of
stakeholder scrutiny (high or low). For example, corporations are more likely to adopt
substantive (i.e., proactive measures taken in order to gain legitimacy) strategies when
the threat to their legitimacy is high (problematic — gaining legitimacy) and stakeholder
scrutiny is high, but will employ symbolic (i.e., reactive, routinized, and defensive
measures taken in order to maintain or repair legitimacy) when the threat to their legitimacy
is low (non-problematic— maintaining or repairing legitimacy) and stakeholder scrutiny is
low.
In conclusion, Suchman's (1995) legitimacy framework combined with Ashforth and
Gibbs (1990) substantive versus symbolic management strategies reflect legitimacy issues
posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic for corporations operating in SSA countries. For
example, while perhaps in the short-term the disease might have appeared less important
(low threat to legitimacy and stakeholder scrutiny) to the ability of corporations to conduct
sustainable operations, and therefore, symbolic management responses might have been
appropriate, as the negative effects (i.e., high levels of absenteeism, employee turnover,
skilled labor losses, and medical/entitlement payment costs) of the disease become more
apparent with direct negative consequences for the survival of corporations (including the
financial bottomline) in the long-term, substantive management strategies are expected to
be implemented. In this case, we contend that the voluntary adoption, compliance with,
and disclosure of good practice recommendations contained in the national codes of CG
(e.g., PSCGT, 2002; SEC, Nigeria, 2003; SEC, Ghana, 2010; King Committee, 2010) and
the 2003 GRI guidance on HIV/AIDS among corporations operating in SSA countries will
be a reflection of Suchman's (1995) pragmatic (i.e., exchange, influence, and dispositional
legitimacy), moral (i.e., consequential, procedural, structural, and personal legitimacy), and
cognitive (i.e., comprehensibility and taken-for-granted legitimacy) legitimization approaches,
for which they may elect to engage substantively and/or symbolically with, as advanced by
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990).We therefore apply this framework to develop our hypotheses and
interpret the findings.
4. Literature review: past studies on CHA, CG, and FV; hypotheses development
4.1. Prior evidence on the relationship between quality CG indices and CHA disclosures
A good number of studies have investigated the link between CG and voluntary
disclosures (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Beekes & Brown, 2006; Chau & Gray, 2002;
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Danbolt and Thomas, 2012; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013), as well as CG and FV (Beiner
et al., 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012;
Ntim, 2015). Other studies have investigated how traditional corporate features (e.g., leverage
and profitability) impact SEA practices (Adams, 2002; Barbu et al., 2014a; Crifo & Forget,
2015; Fifka, 2013; Reverte, 2009), whereas some authors have investigated the links among
CG, shareholding structure, board variables, and SEA practices (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005;
Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Lattermann et
al., 2009). However, studies examining how a composite internal quality CG index impacts
CHA disclosures and, consequently, whether CG can moderate the CHA–FV nexus, are rare.
We therefore seek to examine the above strands of the extant literature to identify potential
internal CG structures that can affect CHA practices. Specifically, we examine: (i) how
the quality of a corporation's composite internal CG index impacts its CHA disclosures
and (ii) consequently, whether CG can moderate the link between CHA disclosures and
FV.4.2. The quality of composite internal CG indices and CHA disclosures
The findings of a good number of past studies indicate a positive link between CG
and FV (Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Renders
et al., 2010). On the other hand, studies that examine whether better-governed firms
engage in good SEA practices are comparatively limited (Jamali et al., 2008; Michelon
& Parbonetti, 2012), and acutely so when it comes specifically to CHA practices
(Barako & Brown, 2008; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013). Theoretically, however, a positive
link between good governance and CHA disclosures can be expected because
high managerial monitoring is often an observable characteristic of well-governed
firms (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011), with increased substantive and/or symbolic CHA
disclosures helping to improve corporate legitimacy (i.e., pragmatic, moral, and/or
cognitive legitimacy) by reducing information asymmetry between managers and powerful
stakeholders, such as employees and shareholders. In a similar vein, complying
(i.e., substantively and/or symbolically) with good CG rules (procedural legitimacy —
pragmatic), such as national CG codes and the 2003 GRI guidance on HIV/AIDS,
by committing to increased CHA disclosures may help enhance the legitimacy of company
operations by improving company image and goodwill (i.e., consequential legitimacy –
moral and comprehensibility/taken-for-granted legitimacy – cognitive) (Scott, 1987;
Suchman, 1995), as well as by gaining access to critical resources through the backing of
influential stakeholders (i.e., exchange and influence legitimacy — pragmatic), such as
customers and government (Freeman, 1984; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which can impact FV
positively. Consequently, good governance has been generally theorized as being a part of
CHA practices (Jamali et al., 2008), thereby suggesting a potentially stronger link between
good CG and CHA disclosures (Beekes & Brown, 2006; Elkington, 2006). Additionally, the
CG–CHA disclosure link is usually rendered apparent whenCG is defined from a stakeholder
perspective, which indicates that good governance not only entails sound financial
management for shareholders, but also good social, environmental, ethical, health, and
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unions (Jamali et al., 2008).
Empirically, while the link between individual shareholding/board mechanisms and
SEA disclosures has been investigated by a small number of scholars (Aguilera et al., 2006;
Barako & Brown, 2008; Dam & Scholtens, 2012), there is an acute dearth of past studies that
make use of quality CG indices. Similar to previous research (Gibson & O'Donovan, 2007;
Jamali et al., 2008; Lattermann et al., 2009), and distinctively employing Gompers et al.'s
(2003) broad composite CG index, Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) report a positive CG
index–SEA nexus. Similar recent U.S. (Cai et al., 2012; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012) and
South African (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b) studies report a positive effect of broad
composite quality CG indices on SEA disclosures. As previously discussed, and with respect
to the SSA corporate setting, the “inclusive”CG approach requires corporations to govern not
only in the best interests of shareholders, but also of other stakeholders by addressing a
number of pressing CHA issues such as safety, health (i.e., HIV/Aids), environment, and
social investment. It can be inferred from our discussions above that good governance
is likely to have a positive effect on CHA disclosures, and hence, the first hypothesis to be
tested is:
H1. Ceteris paribus, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the
quality of internal CG, as proxied by a broad composite CG index, and the level of CHA
disclosures.
4.3. The CHA–FV nexus: the moderating impact of CG
Two major opposing ideas exist when it comes to the impact of CHA disclosures on FV.
A major, albeit less dominant, strand of the theoretical literature indicates that firms that
show greater commitment to CHA activities tend to incur extra expenses that make them
less profitable than their counterparts that depict less commitment to CHA activities
(Friedman, 1970; McGuire et al., 1988), and hence, an inverse link between CHA
disclosures and FV can be expected. Such expenses and costs may be in the form of:
(i) direct financial investments in CHA activities; (ii) agency costs arising from excessive
managerial discretion; and (iii) competitive/strategic advantage costs that may arise from
ethical decisions with respect to avoiding competitive investments in certain geographic
locations, products, and services. An opposing theoretical conjecture to the negative one is
that firms that show greater commitment to CHA activities can receive higher market
valuation than their counterparts that display less commitment to CHA practices in several
ways. First, it can be argued that engaging in CHA activities can enhance FV by
minimizing managerial opportunism through the improvement in flow of information
between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Reverte, 2009). Second,
others indicate that engaging in increased CHA (i.e., substantively and/or symbolically)
disclosures may not only help enhance FV by legitimizing the activities and operations of
the corporation (i.e., moral and cognitive legitimacy), but also provide opportunities to
obtain vital corporate assets, e.g., tax exemptions, cheap capital, and high-quality labor
(i.e., pragmatic legitimacy), by enhancing company image, goodwill, and reputation
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). Third, other
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customers, politicians, and local communities) for increased commitment to CHA activities
and disclosures may improve corporate legitimacy and FV by minimizing potential
costs often associated with politics, e.g., nationalization threats, legislation, strikes by
labor unions, and uprisings by local communities (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston,
1995).
In line with the mixed theoretical expectations, a number of prior papers that
have investigated the relationship between SEA practices and FV report conflicting
evidence (Callado-Munoz & Ultrero-Gonzalez, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012;
McGuire et al., 1988; Nelling & Webb, 2009). Existing studies, which have focused
almost exclusively on traditional SEA practices (to the neglect of CHA practices), are also
limited to a small number of advanced economies that tend to depict some level of
similarities in national government effectiveness, the quality of national public health
infrastructure and delivery effectiveness, and regulatory and other institutional research
settings (Becchetti & Ciciretti, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Crifo & Forget, 2015; Fifka, 2013).
In addition, whereas research design limitations relating to potential missing and
endogenous variables have been cited as the main cause of the conflicting findings of
prior studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003), the latest results from
authors who adequately resolve such methodological challenges remain equally
inconsistent (Bird et al., 2007; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Lo & Sheu, 2007; Scholtens, 2007,
2008).
By contrast, a large amount of evidence indicates a positive link between CG and
FV (see Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Henry,
2008; Renders et al., 2010). Thus, as the decision to show greater commitment to
CHA activities is normally initiated by top management, our conjecture is that CG
may have a moderating impact on the link between CHA disclosures and FV. Our
intuition is informed by a small but gradually growing strand of studies that indicate that
although capital markets value both CG practices and SEA disclosures, CG is valued more
highly than SEA disclosures (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Jamali et al., 2008; Ntim,
Opong and Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a; Starks, 2009). This means that
while firms with good CG structures tend to have higher market valuation, such firms are
also more likely to engage in good SEA practices, and thus the higher market valuation is
mainly due to good CG practices instead of good SEA practices per se. However, the main
limitation of the current literature is that they have examined the direct effect of SEA
disclosures on FV without considering the possible moderating role of CG on the
association between SEA and FV. Additionally, existing studies have examined these
issues by focusing mainly on traditional SEA practices to the neglect of CHA practices,
resulting in an acute lack of understanding of how and why CHA might affect FV, and
consequently, whether CG can moderate the connection between CHA and FV. As a result,
our objective is to contribute to the extant international CG and CHA literature by
distinctively investigating the CHA–FV nexus, and thus the final hypotheses to be tested
are:
H2a. Ceteris paribus, there is a positive but weak direct relationship between CHA
disclosures and FV.
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between CHA disclosures and FV.
5. Research design
5.1. Data and sample considerations
Our sample is based on 573 non-financial3 corporations listed on the national stock
exchanges of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (24, 45, 156, 291, and
57, respectively), with complete data for the years 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013,
chosen from five industrial sectors: basic materials/oil & gas, consumer goods, consumer
services, industrials, and technology/telecoms as of 31 December 2013. The results of prior
studies indicate that the type of industry and the size of the firm tend to affect CG and SEA
disclosures (Barako et al., 2006; Barbu et al., 2014a; Beekes & Brown, 2006; Chau &
Gray, 2002; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Crifo & Forget, 2015;
Eng & Mak, 2003; ; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2015), and therefore we selected the 10
largest (i.e., 2 each from the 5 industries) and 10 smallest (i.e., 2 each from the 5 industries)
companies from each of the 5 selected SSA countries using their share capitalization with a
view to accounting adequately for industrial sectors and company size. Hence, the final
sample was made up of 100 listed firms over a period of 5 years, resulting in a total sum of
500 financial year observations from 5 SSA countries and industrial sectors for our3 Our sample excludes ﬁnancials and utilities because they tend to be: (i) tightly regulated and (ii) heavily
leveraged— two features that can have different effects on their FV, CHA and CG mechanisms, and should, thus,
be analyzed separately (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Eng & Mak, 2003; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, Opong,
Danbolt and Thomas, 2012). Moreover, excluding the two industries may make it easier to make comparisons
with the results of prior authors (Campbell et al., 2003; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005;
Gamble et al., 1996; Gray et al., 1995; Newson & Deegan, 2002; Roberts, 1992; Williams, 1999; Al-Bassam,
Ntim, Opong, & Downs, forthcoming), who also did not include ﬁnancials and utilities in their samples. Hence, in
line with prior papers (Barako et al., 2006; Beekes & Brown, 2006; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Filatotchev &
Nakajima, 2014; Ntim et al., 2015; Reverte, 2009), we restrict our sample to non-ﬁnancials with the following
breakdown: (i) Ghana: 24 out of a total of 35 listed ﬁrms; (ii) Kenya: 45 out of a total of 60 listed ﬁrms; (iii)
Nigeria: 156 out of a total of 223 listed ﬁrms; (iv) South Africa: 291 out of a total of 402 listed ﬁrms; and (i)
Zimbabwe: 57 out of a total of 81 listed ﬁrms. The sample starts in 2005 because it was the earliest year for which
the required data was systematically available across the ﬁve countries and ends in 2013 because: (i) it was the
most recent ﬁnancial year in which the required data was accessible in the Perfect Information Database and
DataStream, and (ii) it also permitted longitudinal analyses. However, because CG and CHA variables tend to be
sticky, we sample every other year instead of each consecutive year from 2005 to 2013. The complete data
required were obtained for 24, 36, 101, 169, and 40, respectively, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Nigerian, South African,
and Zimbabwean listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Collecting the CG and CHA data manually involved a considerable
amount of labor hours and thus, we restricted our ﬁnal sample to 20 ﬁrms from each of the 5 sampled SSA
countries (consisting of 10 small and 10 large ﬁrms with 2 small and 2 large ﬁrms each from the 5 industries), with
full data available for the 5 years examined (i.e., 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013).
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firms' published annual reports, including 69 standalone sustainability reports, which were
obtained from the Perfect Information Database (and supplemented with company
websites where annual reports are not found in Perfect Information), and the financial and
stock market variables were collected from DataStream.5.2. Variables and measures
Our measures and proxies are grouped into 6 different kinds, presented in the
Appendices (Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3) and Table 1 with detailed
information regarding how each variable was operationalized. First, in testing H1, our
central dependent variable is the total CHA disclosure scores: CHADW (CHADI), which
seeks to measure the quantity by word count (CHADW) and quality by a disclosure index
(CHADI, containing 50 disclosure items) of CHA disclosures covering four broad areas as
set out by 2003 GRI's reporting guidance on HIV/AIDS, consisting of: (i) 15 disclosure
items on good governance (GOVDW or GOVDI); (ii) 9 disclosure items on measurement,
monitoring, and evaluation (MMEDW or MMEDI); (iii) 6 disclosure items on workplace
conditions and HIV/AIDS management (WCHDW or WCHDI); and (iv) 20 disclosure
items on depth, quality, and sustainability of CHA disclosure programs (DQSDW or
DQSDI). This constitutes one of the largest datasets to be employed on CHA disclosures to
date. Appendix 1 lists all 50 items scored.
The widely used content analysis technique of coding narratives, graphs, pictures, and
numbers into different themes and patterns was employed in collecting the SEA data
(Deegan, 2002; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Krippendorff, 1980, 2004; Marston & Shrives,
1991; Parker, 2005; Unerman, 2000). Two main issues needed to be addressed in order to
use the content analysis technique to accurately code the CHA disclosures. First, there are
two main measurement approaches — quantitative measures, such as word, sentence,
paragraph, and page counts (which seek to measure the volume of CHA disclosures), and
qualitative measures, such as disclosure indices (which seek to measure either only the4 The following factors inﬂuenced the criteria for selecting our ﬁnal sample. In the ﬁrst place, we focused on
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe because they are the largest and most active stock markets in
SSA with comparatively sufﬁcient data available in Perfect Information Database and DataStream to permit
serious empirical analyses. For example, together, the ﬁve countries account for over 80% of both SSA stock
market capitalization and GDP. Second, the ﬁve countries share a number a common characteristics: (i) they are
all countries of Anglo–Saxon origin with similar accounting (e.g., the central objective of accounting is to address
the micro/ﬁrm aim of maximizing shareholder value compared with addressing the macro objective of improving
economic growth and national development), auditing, CG (e.g., South African and Zimbabwean listed ﬁrms use
the same King Reports on CG), and legal (common law) systems; (ii) they all require listed ﬁrms to prepare their
ﬁnancial statements in accordance with international accounting standards; and (iii) they have similar corporate
law and ownership structures; thereby permitting comparability of CG and CHA disclosures among ﬁrms and
across countries. Second, following prior studies (Henry, 2008; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), the criteria
helped in meeting the requirements for balanced panel analysis. Advantages for employing panel data include
limited multi-collinearities and more observations along both cross-sectional and time series dimensions (Gujarati,
2003; Wooldridge, 2010). The ﬁnal reason is that employing a 5-year panel data with both time series and cross-
sectional dimensions can be useful in determining whether cross-sectional associations among CG, CHA, and FV
measures hold over time.
Table 1
Summary of measures and variables.
Corporate health accounting (CHA) variables — quantity measure (word count)
CHADW The total word count of corporate health accounting (CHA) disclosure proxy covering 4 broad areas as
set out by 2003 GRI's reporting guidance on HIV/AIDS, consisting of: (i) good governance
(GOVDW); (ii) measurement, monitoring, and evaluation (MMEDW); (iii) workplace conditions and
HIV/AIDS management (WCHDW); and (iv) depth, quality and sustainability of programs (DQSDW
of CHA practices, that is normalized by taking a natural log.
OTHERS The total word count of CHA disclosures relating to: (i) good governance (GOVDW); (ii
measurement, monitoring and evaluation (MMEDW); (iii) workplace conditions and HIV/AIDS
management (WCHDW); and (iv) depth, quality, and sustainability of programs (DQSDW) of CHA
practices, which is normalized by taking a natural log.
Corporate health accounting (CHA) variables — qualitative measure (disclosure index)
CHADI A CHA practice disclosure index covering four broad areas as set out by 2003 GRI's reporting
guidance on HIV/AIDS, consisting of: (i) good governance (GOVDI); (ii) measurement, monitoring
and evaluation (MMEDI); (iii) workplace conditions and HIV/AIDS management (WCHDI); and
(iv) depth, quality, and sustainability of programs (DQSDI) of CHA practices. All 50 items have a
score ranging from 0 to 6 (i.e., 0 — no disclosure; 1 — past or historical disclosures; 2 — past and
future or forward-looking disclosures; 3 — past, future, and bad or negative disclosures; 4 — past
future, negative, and good or positive disclosures; 5 — past, future, negative, positive, and
non-monetary/qualitative disclosures; and 6 — past, future, negative, positive, non-monetary
qualitative, and quantitative/monetary disclosures). This weighted scoring procedure can result in a
total potential score of 300, scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. These CHA items and the
scoring procedure are contained in Appendix 1. Appendix 3 also contains specific CHA disclosures
and how they were classified and scored.
Firm value (FV) variables
OROA Operating profit to total assets, which is expressed as a percentage.
TBQ Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.
TRS Total returns on a company's listed share made up of capital gains and dividend yield, which is
expressed as a percentage.
Corporate governance (CG)/alternative CG variables
CGI CG index containing 88 common CG items drawn from the national CG codes of Ghana (SEC CG
Code, 2010), Kenyan (PSCGT CG Code, 2002), Nigeria (SEC CG Code, 2003), South Africa (King
Report, 2010) and Zimbabwe (King Report, 2010). Each CG item takes a value of 1 if the item is
disclosed in the annual report, 0 otherwise; the total score from the 88 items is scaled to a value
between 0% and 100%. These CG items are contained in Appendix 2.
BSIZE Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company.
BSHARE The percentage of ordinary shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total number o
ordinary company shareholdings.
GDIV The percentage of female directors on a firm's board of directors.
GSHARE The percentage of ordinary shares held by government of the total number of ordinary company
shareholdings.
INED The percentage of independent, non-executive directors on a firm's board of directors.
ISHARE The percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders of the total number of ordinary
company shareholdings.
Moderation variables
M ∗ CGI Moderation variables are created between CGI and CHADI by interacting them (i.e., multiplying by
each other). Similar moderation variables were created for the shareholding and board variable
(M ∗ BSHARE, M ∗ BSIZE, M ∗ GDIV, M ∗ GSHARE, M ∗ INED, and M ∗ ISHARE) CG
mechanisms as part of our sensitivity analysis.







AFSIZ 1 if a company is audited by a Big Four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst
& Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.
CAPEX Total capital expenditure to total assets, expressed as a percentage.
DLIST 1 if a firm is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.
FSIZE Natural log of total assets.
GOVCO 1 if a firm has established a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise
GEAR Total debt to total assets, expressed as a percentage.
GROTH Current year's sales minus previous year's sales to previous year's sales, expressed as a percentage.
RISK Standard deviation of the FV measure (i.e., TBQ/OROA/TRS).
SEACO 1 if a firm has established a social, health, and environmental accounting committee, 0 otherwise.
COUD Dummies for each of the five countries: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
DIND Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material and oil gas; consumer goods, consumer
services, and healthcare; industrials; and technology and telecoms firms.
DYED Dummies for each of the 5 years of 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013.
Table 1 (continued)
171Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216volume of information disclosed: binary/unweighted indices, and/or both the volume and
quality of information disclosed — weighted indices) (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004;
Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Beck, Campbell, & Shrives, 2010; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011;
Milne & Adler, 1999; Tom, 2002; Wiseman, 1982). Advantages for using quantitative
measures (e.g., word counts) include ability to measure CHA disclosures (i) in greater detail
and (ii) with high levels of objectivity and reliability (accuracy and stability, reproducibility),
but quantitative measures are often criticized for the increased possibility of capturing
non-CHA disclosures (Beattie et al., 2004; Milne & Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000). By
contrast, qualitative measures (e.g., weighted indices) have the capacity to accurately measure
the volume of quality and meaningful CHA information, but usually are criticized for the high
levels of subjectivity involved and labor-intensive nature (Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Hooks
& Van Staden, 2011; Marston & Shrives, 1991). Therefore, given the limitations of
quantitative and qualitative disclosure proxies articulated above, both word count (quantity
measure) and disclosure index (quality measure) are employed as a way of checking the
sensitivity of the results. With respect to our quality index, and as binary/unweighted indices
are unable to capture differences in disclosure quality (i.e., similar limitation in word counts,
but word counts can be measured more accurately and in greater detail than binary/
unweighted indices), we adopted a weighted disclosure index approach.5 Several weighted
disclosure approaches have been articulated in the literature, often with three-scale scoring
levels (no, qualitative, and quantitative information) (Beattie et al., 2004; Beattie & Thomson,
2007; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011; Marston & Shrives, 1991; Wiseman, 1982), but
sometimes with higher levels, such as six-scale scoring levels (no, qualitative, quantitative,
monetary, explanation, and comparison of information) (Beck et al., 2010; Tom, 2002). The5 However, to be certain and based also on the recommendations of an anonymous reviewer, we re-coded 40
(8 each from the 5 industries consisting of 4 large and 4 small ﬁrms) annual reports by using a simple binary/
unweighted CHA index (i.e., 1 if present, 0 otherwise). The correlation between the binary CHA scores and
the corresponding seven-level weighted CHA scores were fairly high at 0.69, but the statistical properties
(e.g., standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) of the distribution of the weighted index were better than the binary
index. Therefore, and given the highly labor-intensive nature of manual collection, we limited our main analysis to our
weighted quality CHA disclosure index and quantitative CHA measure (word counts).
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of descriptors [e.g., although both Tom (2002) and Beck et al. (2010) use six-scale scoring
levels, their descriptors of the scoring levels are completely different], and as such, are often
not repeated by any other researcher, thereby bringing the reliability and validity of such
measurement into question.We therefore adopted a seven-scale scoring level approachwhose
reliability and validity has consistently been demonstrated by repeat adoptions, especially in
measuring corporate risk disclosures (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004;
Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013). Specifically, the CHA
(HIV/AIDS) disclosure sentences (see Appendix 1 for detailed information on the four
categories, 50 sub-categories, and the seven-scale scoring procedure) were coded on a scale of
‘0’ to ‘6,’ whereby ‘0’ referred to ‘no HIV/AIDS disclosure information is contained’ and ‘6’
implied ‘complete CHA (HIV/AIDS) disclosure information,’ containing all seven possible
dimensions of CHA (HIV/AIDS) disclosure. The total scores were then expressed as a
percentage, ranging from the lowest (0 × 50 = 0, 0%) to the highest (6 × 50 = 300, 100%).
Appendix 3 contains specific examples of CHA (HIV/AIDS) disclosures and how they were
classified and coded.
The second issue that we address is the reliability of our self-constructed CHA disclosure
index. Two main approaches to achieving reliability have been articulated in the literature
(Beattie et al., 2004; Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011; Marston &
Shrives, 1991; Milne & Adler, 1999). One way to achieve reliability is to use multiple coders
and demonstrate few errors/discrepancies, which are resolved through further testing among
coders. The alternative approach is to use a single coder, but reliability is achieved by
completing an initial pilot sample and resolving any discrepancies. In this study, the second
approach was adopted, in which a single coder performed the content analysis. However, to
ensure consistency and reliability, an initial sample of 10 annual reports (2 from each industry
consisting of 1 large and 1 small firm each) were coded independently by two coders. In the
first stage of pre-testing or piloting, each coder coded 5 annual reports (i.e., 10 annual reports
between the two coders). Noticeably, no major differences emerged, with the coefficient of
agreement between the two coders sufficiently high at 0.85; note that the cut-off level for
acceptability ranges from 0.70 to 0.80 (Beattie et al., 2004; Beattie & Thomson, 2007;
Krippendorff, 1980, 2004; Marston & Shrives, 1991; Milne & Adler, 1999). Minor
differences that emerged from stage 1 were, therefore, discussed and agreed on, with no
differences emerging in the subsequent (second stage) pre-testing of the coding instrument on
the remaining 10 annual reports between the two coders.
Second, in testing H1, the key explanatory measure that we employ is a simple
dichotomous (i.e., binary/unweighted — 1 if present, 0 otherwise) composite CG index
(CGI) consisting of 88 common CG items compiled from the national codes of CG used by
Ghanaian (SEC, Ghana, 2010), Kenyan (PSCGT, 2002), Nigerian (SEC, Nigeria, 2003),
and South African/Zimbabwean (King Committee, 2010) listed firms containing 4 major
parts: (i) directors and boards; (ii) accounting, auditing, disclosure, and transparency;
(iii) internal audit, risk management, and control; and (iv) compliance, shareholder rights,
and enforcement. Appendix 2 contains the details of the full 88 CG items and how they
were scored. Unlike the CHA (HIV/AIDS) disclosures, we adopted a simple binary
approach in constructing our CG index. This is because whereas most of the CHA
disclosures require some level of judgment regarding their quality, a majority of the CG
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chairperson and CEO/MD are split (‘1’) or not (‘0’); the chairperson of the board is an
independent, non-executive director (‘1’) or not (‘0’); a nomination committee has been
established (‘1’) or not (‘0’); and the nomination committee is chaired by an independent
director (‘1’) or not (‘0’), among others. This leaves no or limited opportunities to
qualitatively discriminate among disclosure levels, such as meaningfully differentiating
between firms that provide a quantification of the information disclosed or not, and thus
using ordinal instead of binary coding would be less appropriate.
Third, and to test H1 and H2, we collect data on corporate shareholdings relating to block
shareholding (BSHARE), government shareholding (GSHARE), and institutional shareholding
(ISHARE), and board variables relating to board size (BSIZE), independent, non-executive
directors (INED), and gender diversity within the board of directors (GDIV). As several
studies show that these variables can impact CHA disclosures (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011;
Barako & Brown, 2008; Cai et al., 2012; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005;
Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Hillman et al., 2001; Jamali et al., 2008; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012;
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), we include them as our
first set of control variables (as alternative CG mechanisms to our composite CG index).
Fourth, and to test H2a and b, Tobin's Q (TBQ) is used as the key variable for FV.
However, operating return on assets (OROA) and total returns on a company's listed share
(TRS) are also employed, respectively, as alternative financial accounting- and stock
market-related FV measures. Fifth, and to ascertain whether CG can moderate the CHA–
FV link (H2b), CGI and CHA are interacted (i.e., multiplied) as CGI and CHADI to create
a new variable (M ∗ CG1). Finally, and to address potential problems relating to omitted
variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), we include a second set of control variables
consisting of a number of traditional firm-level characteristics, namely the size of the audit
firm (AFSIZ), the amount of expenditure on capital items or investments (CAPEX),
dual-listing (DLIST), the size of the firm (FSIZE), gearing (GEAR), whether a CG
committee has been established (GOVCO), growth in annual sales revenues (GROTH), the
level of risk (RISK), whether a SEA committee has been set up (SEACO), dummy variables
for industry (DIND), country dummies (COUD), and dummy variables for the year of
operation (DYED). To save space, specific hypotheses relating to the control measures on
the one hand, and CG, CHA, and FV on the other hand, are not explicitly developed, but
rigorously established theoretical literature and empirical studies exist indicating that the
above set of control variables have the capacity to influence CG, CHA, and FV (Beiner et al.,
2006; Crifo & Forget, 2015; Fifka, 2013; Henry, 2008; McGuire et al., 1988; Reverte, 2009).
6. Empirical analyses and discussion
6.1. Univariate statistics and bivariate regression analyses
Tables 2 and 3 present univariate statistics of the variables for the pooled sample and
each of the five SSA countries, respectively. For brevity, we do not discuss the univariate
statistics in detail, but in the main they indicate that the quality (CHADI% — CHA
disclosure index) and quantity (CHADW — CHA word count disclosures) CHA variables
show wide variations. In Table 2, for instance, CHADW (CHADI) spans a minimum of 4
Table 2
Summary descriptive statistics of all variables for all 500 firm years (pooled).
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Maximum Minimum
Panel A: corporate health accounting (CHA) variables — quantity measures (word count)
CHADW 1,986.65 1,843.50 2,787.28 10,984.00 4.00
DQSDW 1,310.40 1,296.00 1,032.20 5,786.00 4.00
GOVDW 697.89 685.00 820.07 2,452.00 6.00
MMEDW 987.16 854.60 948.63 3,318.00 6.00
WCHDW 305.21 298.00 415.14 1,638.00 6.00
Panel B: corporate health accounting (CHA) variables — quality measures (disclosure index)
CHADI (%) 55.63 56.66 18.81 83.33 1.33
DQSDI (%) 59.72 57.75 16.06 81.48 3.70
GOVDI (%) 60.53 61.11 17.90 86.67 4.44
MMEDI (%) 64.44 63.89 17.54 91.17 2.78
WCHDI (%) 53.48 54.17 18.05 83.33 3.33
Panel C: corporate governance (CG)/alternative CG variables
CGI (%) 61.24 62.50 15.56 97.72 4.55
BSHARE (%) 56.43 54.25 18.50 100.00 5.32
BSIZE 11.26 10.00 5.08 28.00 3.00
GDIV (%) 29.52 25.35 17.35 88.41 0.00
GSHARE (%) 25.32 20.42 17.03 89.46 0.00
INED (%) 42.68 41.36 16.69 90.45 4.65
ISHARE (%) 58.73 56.59 17.16 96.52 2.98
Panel D: firm value (FV)/alternative FV variables
OROA (%) 10.31 11.65 14.23 94.46 −20.75
TBQ 1.52 1.34 0.89 7.84 0.25
TRS (%) 33.49 30.70 51.65 286.32 −80.53
Panel E: control variables — firm-level characteristics
AFSIZ (%) 79.52 100.00 38.31 100.00 0.00
CAPEX (%) 5.41 5.28 6.98 72.64 0.00
GOVCO (%) 38.43 0.00 43.85 100.00 0.00
DLIST (%) 35.25 0.00 39.58 100.00 0.00
GEAR (%) 45.90 44.53 18.83 94.75 1.28
FSIZE 3.93 3.80 0.98 6.42 0.65
RISK (%) 36.42 20.96 47.66 412.47 1.43
GROTH (%) 9.68 11.32 32.42 96.52 −98.76
SEACO 32.89 0.00 45.80 100.00 0.00
Notes: Table 1 fully defines all the variables used.
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(CHA disclosure index score), hence indicating that a large amount of variability exists when
it comes to the significance that SSA-listed firms accord HIV/AIDs practices. Similarly, the
measures relating to the four categories that make up the summary CHA (CHADW or
CHADI), namely: (i) depth, quality, and sustainability of programs disclosures (DQSDW—
word counts or DQSDI— disclosure index); (ii) good governance disclosures (GOVDW—
word counts or GOVDI — disclosure index); (iii) measurement, monitoring, and evaluation
disclosures (MMEDW — word counts or MMEDI — disclosure index); and (iv) workplace
Table 3
Summary descriptive statistics of all variables for all 500 firm years for the five SSA countries.
Variable All firms Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa Zimbabwe
Panel A: corporate health accounting (CHA) variables — quantity measures (word count)
CHADW
Mean 1,986.65 359.74 418.65 764.92 2,195.84 1,396.32
Std. dev. 2,878.28 798.62 964.51 1,487.46 2,853.78 2,248.73
Min 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Max. 10,984.00 3,043.41 3,645.00 5,687.00 10,984.00 8,658.00
Panel B: corporate health accounting (CHA) variables — quality measures (disclosure index)
CHADI (%)
Mean 55.63 32.46 45.76 49.65 63.42 58.52
Std. dev. 18.81 16.94 17.23 16.78 18.96 17.80
Min 1.33 1.33 2.00 2.67 1.33 2.00
Max. 83.33 78.33 80.00 78.33 83.33 83.33
Panel C: corporate governance (CG)/alternative CG variables
CGI (%)
Mean 61.24 42.36 56.87 59.93 68.40 64.64
Std. dev. 15.56 13.85 14.38 14.65 15.05 14.85
Min 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 6.82 6.82
Max. 97.72 91.09 93.18 93.18 97.72 95.45
GDIV (%)
Mean 29.52 30.31 24.63 26.92 33.50 31.28
Std. dev. 17.35 12.86 11.47 12.23 17.75 14.94
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 88.41 63.42 53.78 59.85 88.41 82.42
BSIZE
Mean 11.26 9.43 9.32 12.00 11.63 9.85
Std. dev. 5.08 3.45 4.06 4.78 4.34 4.59
Min 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Max. 28.00 18.00 20.00 28.00 21.00 28.00
BSHARE (%)
Mean 56.43 48.63 49.65 60.48 57.43 61.85
Std. dev. 18.50 16.42 15.30 16.75 17.35 18.03
Min 5.32 5.32 7.63 5.39 5.41 5.62
Max. 100.00 90.31 93.54 96.40 100.00 100.00
GSHARE (%)
Mean 25.32 19.42 22.86 29.53 26.48 28.57
Std. dev. 17.03 10.55 12.87 14.15 16.14 17.34
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 89.46 55.42 67.62 74.31 84.78 89.46
INED (%)
Mean 42.68 36.54 38.46 44.13 48.65 40.30
Std. dev. 16.69 15.65 14.98 15.56 16.22 15.89
Min 4.65 4.93 4.65 4.55 6.92 5.23
Max. 90.45 88.64 73.42 80.20 90.45 86.30
ISHARE (%)
Mean 58.73 38.65 45.68 62.64 65.52 60.31
Std. dev. 17.16 12.43 12.96 13.72 16.78 14.24
Min 2.98 2.98 3.40 4.28 3.76 3.27
Max. 96.52 65.74 72.63 79.44 96.52 79.65
(continued on next page
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Table 3 (continued)
Variable All firms Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa Zimbabwe
Panel D: firm value (FV)/alternative FV variables
TBQ
Mean 1.52 1.25 1.31 1.43 1.78 1.67
Std. dev. 0.89 0.67 0.69 0.80 0.76 0.85
Min 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.53 0.69 0.58
Max. 7.84 6.32 6.76 7.84 7.25 9.42
Notes: Table 1 fully defines all the variables used.
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disclosure index), exhibit wide spreads in their distributions. It is discernible that DQSDW
shows the highest HIV/AIDS word count disclosures, spanning from the lowest of 4 to the
highest of 5786 words and an average of 1310 words. On the other hand,WCHDW shows the
smallest number of HIV/AIDS word count disclosures, spanning from a lowest of 6 to the
highest of 1638 words, with the median firm disclosing 298 words on workplace conditions
and HIV/AIDS management disclosures (WCHDW).
In addition, the (i) CG index (CGI); (ii) alternative CG (control) variables — block
shareholding (BSHARE), board size (BSIZE), gender diversity within the board of directors
(GDIV), government shareholding (GSHARE), independent non-executive directors
(INED), and institutional shareholding (ISHARE); (iii) firm value (FV) measures —
(operating return on assets— OROA, Tobin's Q— TBQ, and total returns on a company's
listed shares — TRS); and (iv) traditional firm-level control variables — audit firm size
(AFSIZ), capital expenditure (CAPEX), CG committee (GOVCO), dual-listing (DLIST),
firm size (FSIZE), gearing (GEAR), growth in annual sales revenues (GROTH), risk
(RISK), and SEA committee (SEACO) variables, all depict sufficient variabilities in their
distributions. For example, the distribution of the CG index (CGI) spans from the lowest of
4.55% to the highest of 97.72%, with the mean firm disclosing 62.50% of the 88 CG items,
whereas the median board size (BSIZE) is 10, with the smallest board having only 3
members and the largest board having 28 members. This appears to indicate that SSA
sampled firms were sufficiently chosen and hence reduces the likelihood of any serious
bias relating to the selected final sample that has arguably been the feature of a good
number of previous studies.
Further, Table 3 reports univariate statistics for the same set of measures, but at the
country level, with the variables depicting similarly wide spreads in their distributional
properties. For example, CHADW — word count disclosures (CHADI% — disclosure
index) for Zimbabwe ranges from a minimum of 6 (2.00%) to a maximum of 8658
(83.33%), with an average of 1396 (58.52%) words. Similar distributional properties can
be observed in the variables relating to Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.
Observably, HIV/AIDS disclosures are lowest in Ghana, having a mean CHADW— word
count disclosures (CHADI% — disclosure index) of 360 words (32.46%), but highest in
South Africa with an average CHADW (CHADI%) of 2196 words (63.42%). In terms of
the CG variables, average board size (BSIZE) is discernibly larger in Nigeria with 12
directors but is the smallest in Kenya with 9 directors. On average, board gender diversity
(GDIV) is highest in South Africa with 33.50% (i.e., about 3 women out of every 10
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whereas the average block shareholding — BSHARE (government shareholding —
GSHARE) is highest in Zimbabwe with 61.85% (28.57%), but lowest in Ghana with
48.63% (19.42%). South Africa has the highest average CG index (CGI) score of 68.40%,
independent NEDs (INED) of 48.65%, institutional shareholding (ISHARE) of 65.52%,
and TBQ of 1.78, whereas Ghana has the lowest comparable scores for all four variables.
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix for the variables to test for multicollinearity. To
determine the robustness of our findings, we report both the Pearson's parametric and
Spearman's non-parametric coefficients and, discernibly, the direction and magnitude of
both coefficients are generally similar, hence suggesting that any remaining non-normalities
may not pose a serious problem. Discernibly, the bivariate correlations among the variables
are also averagely low, indicating that any remaining multicollinearity problems may not be
harmful. Interestingly and as expected, the CG index (CGI), board size (BSIZE), board
gender diversity (GDIV), government shareholding (GSHARE), and independent NEDs
(INED) have a statistically significant positive relationship with the CHA disclosure index
(CHADI), whereas block shareholding (BSHARE) has a negative relationship with the CHA
disclosure index (CHADI). By contrast, the significant negative association between
institutional shareholding (ISHARE) and the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) is not
consistent with our expectations. In addition, significant associations exist among the CHA,
CG, FV, and the control measures employed. For example, audit firm size (AFSIZ), dual-
listing (DLIST), firm size (FSIZE), CG committee (GOVCO), risk (RISK), and SEA
committee (SEACO) have a positive association with the CHA disclosure index (CHADI),
whereas capital expenditure (CAPEX) and gearing (GEAR) have a negative but statistically
insignificant connection with the CHA disclosure index (CHADI).
6.2. Multivariate regression analyses
Public companies normally differ in the opportunities and challenges that they may
experience in their lifetime (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010), which may result in a situation in
which CG and CHA disclosures may be vigorously determined by undetectable company-
level heterogeneities, e.g., managerial ability, firm complexity, and company culture
(Guest, 2009; Henry, 2008), and thus rendering less powerful estimation methods, such as
ordinary least squares, incapable of detecting them (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010).
Thus, in line with prior research that uses balanced panel data (Guest, 2009; Henry, 2008;
Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012), the empirical investigation is carried out by employing a
fixed-effects estimation method that is appropriate for panel data with the aim of
addressing possible endogeneity problems, which can arise from unidentifiable firm-level
differences. As a result, the empirical examination starts with the estimation of a basic
fixed-effects model in the following form:
CHAit ¼ α0 þ β1CGIit þ
Xn
i¼1
β iCONTROLSit þ γi þ εit ð1Þ
in which CHA refers to the quantity (CHADW— number of HIV/AIDS words counted) or
quality (CHADI— CHA disclosure index) CHA disclosure measure; CGI is our composite
6 The decision to use the ﬁxed-effects method was also inﬂuenced by the rejection of the random-effect
alternative in favor of the ﬁxed-effects approach by the Hausman speciﬁcation test, which we conducted.
Table 4
Pearson's and Spearman's correlation matrices of the variables for all 500 firm years.
Variable CHADI CGI GDIV BSHARE BSIZE GSHARE INED ISHARE
CHADI .442*** .123*** − .184*** .120*** .190*** .194*** − .111***
CGI .490*** .126*** − .190*** .146*** .148*** .099** − .038
GDIV .120*** .116** − .052 .430*** .126*** .130*** .045
BSHARE −.130*** − .163*** − .028 − .030 − .238*** − .175*** .240***
BSIZE .125*** .140*** .347*** − .009 .322*** .038 .146***
GSHARE .175*** .190*** .095** − .215*** .212*** .240*** .275***
INED .192*** .183*** .135*** − .140*** .001 .116*** .050
ISHARE −.163*** − .040 .011 .360*** .130*** .175*** .060
TBQ .079* .235*** − .078* − .111** − .080* .001 .089* .280***
AFSIZ .314*** .341*** .118*** .036 .098** .032 − .058 − .004
CAPEX −.001 − .030 .104** .105** .109** .108** − .030 .117***
GOVCO .380*** .542*** .010 .012 − .060 .090* .112** − .030
DLIST .470*** .210*** − .050 − .044 .085* .160*** .110** .006
SEACO .382*** .213*** − .083* − .052 .002 .136*** .030 − .090**
GEAR −.020 − .028 .025 .080* − .099** − .125*** − .242*** − .002
FSIZE .208*** .180*** .250** − .088* .542*** .386*** .238*** .167***
RISK .210*** .162*** − .088* .116** − .035 .108** .020 − .215***
GROTH .025 .118** .143*** − .116** .120*** .068 .098** − .001
Notes: The bottom left half of the table reports Pearson's parametric correlation coefﬁcients, and the upper righ
half of the table presents Spearman's non-parametric correlation coefﬁcients. ***, **, and * indicate correlation is
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Table 1 contains full deﬁnitions of all the
variables employed.
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firm size (AFSIZ), capital expenditure (CAPEX), dual-listing (DLIST), firm size (FSIZE), CG
committee (GOVCO), gearing (GEAR), growth in annual sales revenues (GROTH), risk
(RISK), SEA committee (SEACO), industry dummies (DIND), country dummies (COUD),
and year dummies (DYED), in which γ is defined as company-level fixed-effects containing a
vector of the differences in the means of the time-variant measures.6
Table 5 reports the findings of estimating the relationship between CG and CHA
disclosures using the quality CHA disclosure index (CHADI) proxy. We start by examining
whether the CG index (CGI) affects the CHA disclosure index (CHADI). The coefficient of
the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) on the CG index (CGI) in Model 1 of Table 5 is
discernibly significant and positive, implying that hypothesis 1 (H1) is empirically supported.
The policy implication is that firms with good CG arrangements tend to show greater
commitment to CHA activities (i.e., using substantive and/or symbolic legitimacy
management strategies) through increased HIV/AIDS disclosures. Theoretically, the results
are in line with the expectations of our legitimacy theoretical framework. Moral and cognitive
legitimacy perspectives suggest that engaging in good CHA practices (i.e., substantively and/
or symbolically) can help minimize agency problems (dispositional legitimacy, pragmatic
and personal legitimacy — moral) and enhance corporate legitimacy (i.e., reputation and
image: comprehensibility and taken-for-granted legitimacy — cognitive) by improving thes
Table 4 (continued)
TBQ AFSIZ CAPEX GOVCO DLIST SEACO GEAR FSIZE RISK GROTH
TBQ AFSIZ CAPEX GOVCO DLIST SEACO GEAR FSIZE RISK GROTH
.077* .310*** − .040 .380*** .460*** .418*** − .032 .230*** .180*** .042
.262*** .329*** − .036 .550*** .192*** .204*** − .044 .167*** .184*** .089**
− .117*** .119*** .080* .003 − .039 − .048 .011 .370*** − .099** .130***
− .050 .037 .118*** .014 − .068 − .088* .090** − .032 .124*** −.098**
− .096** .060 .136*** − .111** .105** .008 − .160*** .587*** − .060 .034
.010 .009 .098** .132*** .190*** .210*** − .325*** .510*** .098** .040
.044 − .060 − .020 .108** .118** .010 − .210*** .210*** .040 .111***
− .197*** − .050 .158*** − .013 − .040 − .054 .001 .198*** − .119*** .007
.042 − .086* .218*** .142*** .240*** − .010 .020 .410*** − .003
.099** .089* .243*** .230*** .046 − .086* .003 .020 − .001
− .050 .098** .030 −.001 .002 − .130*** .312*** − .002 .001
.211*** .240*** .040 .253*** .175*** − .190*** .040 .150*** .060
.125*** .240*** .001 .274*** .310*** − .040 .198*** .118*** .032
.210*** .038 .119** .168*** .296*** .001 .190*** .176*** .003
− .001 − .043 − .149*** − .208*** .025 .010 − .220*** − .010 − .022
.001 .004 − .270*** .089* .190*** .260*** − .220*** .032 .060
.548*** .054 − .052 .178*** .088* .243*** − .026 − .001 − .027
.017 − .003 .110** .094** .013 .072 − .020 .165*** − .032
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other corporate stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and employees) (Beekes & Brown, 2006;
Mallin, 2002), while moral and pragmatic legitimacy indicate that complying with good CG
rules (procedural legitimacy—moral) through greater CHA activities (exchange legitimacy—
pragmatic) not only can improve the legitimacy of corporate activities (Scott, 1987; Suchman,
1995), but also offer opportunities to secure important corporate assets by gaining the support
of influential stakeholders (exchange and influence legitimacy— pragmatic) (Freeman, 1984;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). With reference to the empirical literature, our finding is consistent
with the recommendations of the sampled SSA countries' national codes of CG and similar
findings of the few previous SEA studies (Arora &Dharwadkar, 2011; Cai et al., 2012; Harjoto
& Jo, 2011; Jamali et al., 2008; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim
& Soobaroyen, 2013b; Starks, 2009).
Secondly, a number of previous studies (Barako & Brown, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke,
2005; Hillman et al., 2001; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Lattermann
et al., 2009; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b) suggest
that shareholding and board structures can impact SEA disclosures. Therefore, in order to
determine whether the shareholding and board variables, as control variables, affect CHA
disclosures, Eq. (1) is re-estimated by substituting the CGI with the three shareholding
(block shareholding— BSHARE, government shareholding— GSHARE, and institutional
shareholding— ISHARE) and three board (board size— BSIZE, board gender diversity—
GDIV, and independent NEDs— INED) variables, respectively, in Table 5, Models 2 and
3. The findings indicate that board size (BSIZE), board gender diversity (GDIV), government
Table 5
The impact of corporate governance on corporate health accounting disclosures based on disclosure indices.
Dependent variables
Indep. variables CHADI CHADI CHADI CHADI CHADI DQSDI GOVDI MMEDI WCHDI
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Corporate governance index
CGI 0.190*** – – 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.060 0.131*** 0.120** 0.118**
(0.000) – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.224) (0.000) (0.018) (0.022)
Alternative CG variables as controls — shareholding variables
BSHARE – −0.166*** – −0.120* −0.141*** −0.040 −0.022 −0.140*** −0.128**
– (0.000) – (0.052) (0.000) (0.408) (0.598) (0.000) (0.043)
GSHARE – 0.178*** – 0.150*** 0.089** 0.083* 0.156*** 0.090** 0.138***
– (0.000) – (0.000) (0.021) (0.076) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000)
ISHARE – −0.137** – −0.120** −0.177*** −0.121** −0.168*** −0.152*** −0.111**
– (0.021) – (0.044) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046)
Alternative CG variables as controls — board variables
GDIV – 0.135*** – 0.158*** 0.199*** 0.123** 0.108** 0.078*
– – (0.000) – (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.029) (0.070)
BSIZE – – 0.098** – 0.109** 0.094** 0.080** 0.110*** 0.164***
– – (0.014) – (0.017) (0.015) (0.085) (0.008) (0.000)
INED – – 0.052* – 0.147*** 0.058* 0.130*** 0.065* 0.069*
– – (0.091) – (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.069) (0.054)
Control variables — firm-level characteristics
AFSIZ 0.260*** 0.286*** 0.182** 0.118** 0.119** 0.210*** 0.147** 0.340*** 0.225***

















CAPEX –0.031 −0.036 −0.023 −0.025 −0.035 −0.030 −0.018 −0.045 −0.038
(0.290) (0.279) (0.410) (0.406) (0.275) (0.302) (0.630) (0.218) (0.317)
GOVCO 0.168*** 0.290*** 0.186*** 0.213*** 0.440*** 0.083* 0.256*** 0.314*** 0.198**
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035)
DLIST 0.353*** 0.350*** 0.337*** 0.380*** 0.290*** 0.188** 0.329*** 0.269*** 0.341***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GEAR −0.010 −0.026 −0.025 −0.040 −0.054 −0.006 −0.037 −0.044 −0.052
(0.705) (0.408) (0.416) (0.353) (0.310) (0.805) (0.374) (0.340) (0.318)
FSIZE 0.209*** 0.240*** 0.236*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.238*** 0.209*** 0.260*** 0.255***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RISK 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.057 0.026 0.019 0.060 0.030
(0.450) (0.372) (0.385) (0.476) (0.275) (0.451) (0.686) (0.243) (0.382)
GROTH 0.006 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.030 0.048 0.035 0.046 0.040
(0.732) (0.480) (0.516) (0.525) (0.463) (0.360) (0.361) (0.332) (0.341)
SEACO 0.278*** 0.346*** 0.310*** 0.208*** 0.323*** 0.280*** 0.230*** 0.310*** 0.297***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DYED Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
COUD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.752*** 0.765*** 0.756*** 0.880*** 0.909*** 0.683*** 0.695*** 0.788*** 0.709***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Durbin–W. 2.060 2.072 2.093 2.061 2. 127 1.790 1.893 1.995 1.970
F-value 8.245*** 8.693*** 8.422*** 8.937*** 9.546*** 5.362*** 6.984*** 8.083*** 7.689***
Adj. R2 0.410 0.425 0.418 0.441 0.467 0.359 0.360 0.432 0.378
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and

















182 Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216shareholding (GSHARE), and independent NEDs (INED) are positively related to the CHA
disclosure index (CHADI), but block shareholding (BSHARE) and institutional shareholding
(ISHARE) are negatively associated with the CHA disclosure index (CHADI). However, and
as a robustness check, we include the CG index (CGI) together with the shareholding variables
only in Model 4 of Table 5, and the CG index (CGI) with both the shareholding and board
variables in Model 5 of Table 5, and the central tenor of our results remains generally the same.
Together, the findings also seem to provide support for our legitimacy theoretical
explanations. For example, the negative connection between block shareholding (BSHARE)
and CHA disclosure index (CHADI) offers support for similar past SEA evidence (Arora &
Dharwadkar, 2011; Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Ntim, Soobaroyen, &
Broad, forthcoming; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Elghuweel, Ntim, Opong, &
Avison, forthcoming; Reverte, 2009) as well as pragmatic and moral legitimacy suggestions
that greater monitoring associated with block shareholding (BSHARE) reduces the
requirement for corporate executives to commit to increased CHA activities (exchange
legitimacy— pragmatic) as a way of communicating and justifying (comprehensibility and
taken-for-granted legitimacy— cognitive) corporate CHA strategic choices to owners— as
powerful stakeholders of companies (influence legitimacy — pragmatic). By contrast, the
negative link between the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) and institutional shareholding
(ISHARE) is in line with the results of prior SEA evidence that suggested similar negative
findings (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), but it is inconsistent
with other past SEA evidence that reports a positive CG–SEA association (Aguilera et al.,
2006; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Elghuweel et al., forthcoming) or an
insignificant link between the two variables (Dam & Scholtens, 2012). As block
shareholdings are widespread in the SSA research setting (Ntim, Opong and Danbolt,
2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt and Thomas, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen,
2013a, 2013b; also see Tables 2 and 3), the negative block shareholding (ISHARE)–CHA
disclosure index (CHADI) link seems to indicate that in the SSA setting, institutional owners
tend to be holders of blocks of shares who may also not need to rely on corporate annual
reports for information, but can source such information directly frommanagers. The positive
nexus between block shareholding (BSHARE) and institutional shareholding (ISHARE) in
Table 4 appears to be consistent with our interpretation.
The positive government shareholding (GSHARE)–CHA disclosure index (CHADI)
association is not in line with the negative result of Dam and Scholtens (2012); the results are,
however, consistent with the findings of Elmagrhi, Ntim, andWang (forthcoming), Tagesson,
Blank, Broberg, and Collin (2009); Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui (2013), and Ntim and
Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b), as well as pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy theoretical
predictions, which indicate that corporations may strive to win the support of the relevant
SSA governments as powerful stakeholders of companies (influence legitimacy —
pragmatic), by engaging in CHA disclosures to signal their congruence with government
initiatives (procedural and consequential legitimacy— moral), which can facilitate access to
resources (exchange legitimacy— pragmatic).
The positive connection between board gender diversity (GDIV) and CHA disclosure
index (CHADI) provides support for past SEA evidence (Barako & Brown, 2008; Haniffa
& Cooke, 2005; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b) that suggests increased executive
monitoring is associated with corporate boards possessing greater gender diversity
183Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216(structural legitimacy—moral) and also offers better stakeholder representation (influence
legitimacy — pragmatic), gaining resources (exchange legitimacy — pragmatic) and
enhancing corporate legitimacy (comprehensibility legitimacy — cognitive and disposi-
tional legitimacy — pragmatic). Finally, the positive effect of board size (BSIZE) on CHA
disclosure index (CHADI) is consistent with the results of Mackenzie (2007) and Ntim and
Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b), whereas the positive link between CHA disclosure index
(CHADI) and independent NEDs (INED) is also consistent with recent SEA evidence (Barako
& Brown, 2008; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005;
Hillman et al., 2001; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Lattermann et al., 2009;
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b). Theoretically, larger
boards have greater capacity to monitor managers (structural and personal legitimacy —
moral) and are very rich with respect to experience and skills (exchange legitimacy —
pragmatic). In addition, larger boards have better capacity at representing stakeholder interests
(influence legitimacy— pragmatic) and espousing good corporate democracy (consequential
legitimacy — moral) that can enhance company image, goodwill, and thus, organizational
legitimacy (comprehensibility and taken-for-granted legitimacy— cognitive). Also, pragmatic
legitimacy (influence) indicates that the high level of independence usually associated with
independent NEDs (INED) puts them in a better position to pressure company executives to
commit to increased CHA activities without fear or favor (i.e., being victimized by top
management).
Thirdly, the results indicate that the CG variables can, in the main, explain variations in the
CHADI. However, the summary CHA disclosure index (CHADI) contains 4 CHA sub-
categories such that it is likely for variations to exist in their relationships with the CG
variables. Therefore, we investigate how each of the 4 CHA sub-categories are related to the
CG structures by using the depth, quality, and sustainability of programs disclosure index
(DQSDI); good governance disclosure index (GOVDI); measurement, monitoring, and
evaluation disclosure index (MMEDI); or workplace conditions disclosure index (WCHDI)
instead of the summary CHA disclosure index (CHADI). The findings are reported for the 4
CHA sub-categories in Models 6 to 9 of Table 5, respectively. Apart from the CG index
(CGI)–depth, quality and sustainability of programs disclosure index (DQSDI), block
shareholding (BSHARE)–depth, quality and sustainability of programs disclosure index
(DQSDI) and block shareholding (BSHARE)–good governance disclosure index (GOVDI)
relationships that are not significant, the results are mainly in line with the earlier findings that
firms with: (i) better CG standards; (ii) higher shareholdings by government (GSHARE);
(iii) larger boards (BSIZE); (iv) higher board gender diversity (GDIV); and (v) more
independent boards (INED) tend to show greater commitment to CHA activities through
increased CHA disclosures compared with firms with higher shareholdings by (i) blockholders
(BSHARE) and (ii) institutional owners (ISHARE).
Further, to test the sensitivity of our findings in Table 5, we substitute the CHADI
(i.e., quality CHA disclosure index) with the CHADW (i.e., quantity disclosure measure
based on number of words counted). Table 6 contains the findings. With the exception of the
CG index (CGI)–measurement, monitoring, and evaluation word count disclosures (MMEDW);
block shareholding (BSHARE)–depth, quality, and sustainability word count disclosures
(DQSDW); block shareholding (BSHARE)–measuring, monitoring, and evaluation word count
disclosures (MMEDW); government shareholding (GSHARE)–depth, quality, and sustainability
Table 6
The impact of corporate governance on corporate health accounting disclosures based on word counts.
Dependent variables
Indep. Variables CHADW CHADW CHRDW CHADW CHADW DQSDW GOVDW MMEDW WCHDW
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Corporate governance (CG) index
CGI 0.210*** − – 0.175*** 0.156*** 0.149*** 0.140*** 0.066 0.124**
(0.000) – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.238) (0.017)
Alternative CG variables as controls — shareholding variables
BSHARE – −0.171*** – −0.152*** −0.147*** −0.067 −0.159*** −0.076 −0.142***
– (0.000) – (0.000) (0.000) (0.353) (0.000) (0.230) (0.000)
GSHARE – 0.185*** – 0.153*** 0.167*** 0.065 0.169*** 0.140*** 0.146***
– (0.000) – (0.000) (0.000) (0.200) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ISHARE – −0.118** – −0.176*** −0.123** −0.060 −0.126** −0.138** −0.170***
– (0.045) – (0.000) (0.025) (0.187) (0.030) (0.014) (0.000)
Alternative CG variables as controls — board variables
GDIV – – 0.142*** – 0.066 0.160*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 0.152***
– – (0.000) – (0.188) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BSIZE – – 0.106* – 0.160*** 0.048 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.134***
– – (0.063) – (0.000) (0.354) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
INED – – 0.099* – 0.127** 0.109* 0.125** 0.108* 0.124**
– – (0.065) – (0.033) (0.056) (0.040) (0.059) (0.047)
Control variables — firm-level characteristics
AFSIZ 0.262*** 0.300*** 0.196*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.218*** 0.198*** 0.294*** 0.265***

















CAPEX −0.040 −0.049 −0.030 −0.038 −0.042 −0.035 −0.027 −0.059 −0.040
(0.310) (0.283) (0.440) (0.432) (0.275) (0.487) (0.532) (0.172) (0.423)
GOVCO 0.170*** 0.210*** 0.198*** 0.219*** 0.260*** 0.118** 0.260*** 0.310*** 0.206***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DLIST 0.430*** 0.420*** 0.427*** 0.440*** 0.343*** 0.396*** 0.344*** 0.360*** 0.432***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GEAR −0.033 −0.046 −0.036 −0.058 −0.069 −0.014 −0.050 −0.072 −0.078
(0.650) (0.380) (0.468) (0.186) (0.130) (0.587) (0.290) (0.198) (0.167)
FSIZE 0.238*** 0.246*** 0.240*** 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.246*** 0.249***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RISK 0.039 0.056 0.040 0.030 0.064 0.027 0.023 0.069 0.050
(0.453) (0.350) (0.365) (0.403) (0.355) (0.426) (0.480) (0.365) (0.380)
GROTH 0.019 0.038 0.029 0.021 0.036 0.051 0.049 0.060 0.045
(0.639) (0.443) (0.470) (0.503) (0.435) (0.340) (0.353) (0.310) (0.363)
SEACO 0.289*** 0.345*** 0.311*** 0.374*** 0.320*** 0.292*** 0.220*** 0.377*** 0.390***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DYED Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
COUD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.678*** 0.686*** 0.734*** 0.769*** 0.873*** 0.793*** 0.786*** 0.802*** 0.856***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Durbin–W. 2.076 2.095 2.021 2.089 2. 198 2.065 2.082 2.076 2.087
F-value 8.300*** 8.785*** 8.976*** 9.065*** 9.684*** 8.761*** 9.698*** 8.986*** 9.590***
Adj. R2 0.426 0.438 0.434 0.458 0.473 0.434 0.430 0.430 0.450
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and

















186 Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216word count disclosures (DQSDW); institutional shareholding (ISHARE)–depth, quality, and
sustainability word count disclosures (DQSDW); and board size (BSIZE)–depth, quality, and
sustainability word count disclosures (DQSDW) associations that are not significant inModels 1
to 9 of Table 6, the findings bear close similarities with those presented in Models 1 to 9 of
Table 5. This implies that the previous reported results are generally not sensitive to whether the
CHADI (CHA quality-oriented disclosure index) or CHADW (CHA word count quantity-
oriented disclosures) CHA proxy is employed.
Finally, and to examine whether CHA disclosures drive FV, a simple fixed-effects
equation of the following form is estimated:
FV it ¼ α0 þ β1CHAit þ
Xn
i¼1
β iCONTROLSit þ γi þ εit ð2Þ
in which FV is the firm value measure (i.e., OROA, TBQ, and TRS), and CHA is either our
quality (CHADI — CHA disclosure index) or quantity (CHADW — CHA word count
disclosures) CHAmeasure, and the control variables are similar to those contained in Eq. (1).
Table 7 contains the findings relating to the relationship between the CHA disclosures
and FV. Prior research has generally run the CHA disclosures alone on FV, and thus, our
empirical investigation starts with a simple fixed-effects regression of the CHA disclosure
index (CHADI) on Tobin's Q (TBQ) taking into consideration the control variables. A
positive CHA disclosure index (CHADI)–Tobin's Q (TBQ) nexus is noticeable in Model 1
of Table 7. To determine whether our finding may be sensitive to the CHA disclosure
proxy employed, the CHADI (i.e., the quality-oriented disclosure index) is substituted with
the CHADW (i.e., the quantity-oriented measure based on the number of HIV/AIDS words
counted) in Eq. (2). Discernibly, the finding in Model 2 of Table 7 shows a positive CHA
word count disclosures (CHADW)–FV link, but similarly, it is not statistically significant.
Our finding implies that hypothesis 2a (H2a), which suggests that there is a positive but weak
association between CHA and FV, is empirically supported (Callado-Munoz & Ultrero-
Gonzalez, 2011; McGuire et al., 1988; Nelling & Webb, 2009).
Although the finding that the link between the CHA disclosures and FV is positive but
weak is generally in line with those of prior SEA studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000;
Nelling & Webb, 2009), our suggestion is that CG could be the missing variable when
estimating the CHA–FV relationship. This prediction is influenced by current literature
that suggests a strong CG–FV nexus (Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010; also see
Bozec & Bozec, 2012). This view is also informed by a small but gradually growing body
of theoretical literature and empirical studies (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Cai et al., 2012;
Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jamali et al., 2008; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Ntim, Opong and
Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Starks, 2009), which indicate that the stock
market values CG disclosures more highly than SEA ones. Thus, to determine the potential
moderating effect of CG on the CHA–FV nexus, Eq. (2) is re-regressed with an inclusion
of the M ∗ CGI measure (i.e., a moderation term obtained through an interaction of the
CHA disclosure index (CHADI) and CG index (CGI) variables. Observably, the coefficient
of FV (TBQ) on the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) and CHA disclosure index interacted
with the CG index (M ∗ CGI) in Model 3 of Table 7 is positive and statistically significant.
This implies that hypothesis 2b (i.e., H2b), which suggests that CG has a moderating effect
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important contribution to the prior international CG and CHA literature.
Observably (albeit not the main focus of the study), the traditional control variables also
have significant relationships with the dependent variables, as expected. For example,
audit firm size (AFSIZ), CG committee (GOVCO), dual-listing (DLIST), firm size (FSIZE),
and social and SEA committee (SEACO) are positively related to CHA disclosure index
(CHADI) in Table 5 or CHA word count disclosures (CHADW) in Table 6. Similarly, audit
firm size (AFSIZ), dual-listing (DLIST), risk (RISK), and sales growth (GROTH) are
positively related to the FV proxies (TBQ, OROA and TRS), whereas firm size (FSIZE) is
negatively associated with the FV proxies (TBQ, OROA and TRS) in Table 7. In addition
and although not reported for brevity (but available on request), our industry (DIND), year
(DYED), and country (COUD) dummies suggest discernible differences in the CHA
disclosures (Tables 5 and 6) and FV (Table 7) across industries, years, and countries. For
example, the coefficients on the country (industry) dummies indicate that CHA disclosures
or FV are highest in South Africa (basic materials/oil & gas industry), but lowest in Ghana
(technology/telecoms industry). Finally, the coefficients on the year dummies also suggest
that CHA disclosures were lowest in 2005, but highest (peaked) in 2009, whereas FV was
highest in 2005, but lowest in 2007.76.3. Additional sensitivity checks
Additional empirical investigations are conducted in order to determine the sensitivity of
our findings. In the first place, in order to ascertain whether the capacity of our CG index
(CGI) to influence the association between the CHA disclosures and FV may change if the
board (i.e., board size— BSIZE, board gender diversity—GDIV, and independent NEDs—
INED) and shareholding (i.e., block shareholding— BSHARE, government shareholding—
GSHARE, and institutional shareholding — ISHARE) variables are present, we re-estimate
Eq. (2) by including moderation terms for both sets of variables, respectively, inModels 4 and
5 of Table 7. The results reported in both models are essentially similar to those contained in7 We would like to clarify that our objective is not necessarily to examine how changes in CG policy reforms
impact CHA disclosures and FV. Our objective is to ascertain whether CG can explain observable cross-sectional
differences in CHA disclosures in a sample of listed ﬁrms in SSA countries and consequently, examine whether
CG can moderate the CHA–FV nexus. One reason is that the CG reforms that have been pursued in SSA countries
occurred at different time periods. For example, CG and CHA disclosure reforms began in South Africa as early as
1994, but as late as 2010 in Ghana, thereby making it difﬁcult to examine the effect of CG reform changes on
CHA disclosures along speciﬁc timelines within a cross-country study of this nature. As presented in Subsection
6.3, we have strived to ascertain how robust our reported cross-sectional associations are by estimating a lagged
CHA–FV structure in addition to running an instrumental variable model, with the ﬁndings of both suggesting
that our results are not necessarily spurious. However, and similar to most of the cross-sectional studies that we
review in this study (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Cai et al., 2012; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Haniffa & Cooke,
2005; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Hillman et al., 2001; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012), we
admit that ﬁnding evidence of cross-sectional associations among CG, CHA, and FV cannot necessarily be
inferred as identifying causality relationships among these variables. We discuss these as part of the study's
limitations in the summary and conclusion section.
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diversity (M ∗ GDIV), CHA disclosure index interaction with government shareholding
(M ∗ GSHARE), and CHA disclosure index interaction with independent NEDs (M ∗ INED)
are positively and significantly related to FV — additional new evidence that board gender
diversity, government shareholding, and independent, non-executive directors also have a
moderating influence on the link between the CHA disclosures and FV.
Secondly, in line with the suggestions of Larcker and Rusticus (2010), two extra
methods of resolving possible endogeneity problems are implemented: (i) lagged CHA–
FV form and (ii) instrumental variables model. We estimate a lagged CHA–FV connection
in order to resolve the existence of a potential simultaneous relationship between the CHA
disclosures and FV. Thus, in line with prior studies (McGuire et al., 1988; Ntim &
Soobaroyen, 2013a), Eq. (2) is re-estimated in the following lagged form:
FV it ¼ α0 þ β1CHAit−1 þ
Xn
i¼1
β iCONTROLSit−1 þ γi þ εit−1 ð3Þ
in which every specification is unchanged as in Eq. (2), but we introduce a 1-year lag
between the CHA disclosures and FV. In the main, the findings presented in Model 6 of
Table 7 bear close similarities with those contained in Models 3 to 5 of Table 7, thus
implying that the findings are insensitive to running the CHA–FV nexus in a lagged form.
To address the problem of possible omitted variable endogeneity, the popular instrumental
variable estimation technique is employed (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). To make sure that
the instrumental variable approach is suitable, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman exogeneity test
(Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) is employed to determine whether Tobin's Q (TBQ) is
endogenously related to the CHA disclosure index (CHADI). Thus, we employ the test to
Eq. (2), with the results suggesting that there is an endogenous relationship between the CHA
disclosure index (CHADI) and Tobin's Q (TBQ), meaning that the instrumental variable
approach seems proper, and thereby casting some doubts over our previous results obtained
from the fixed-effects estimations. The instrumental variable approach consists of two stages. In
stage 1, informed by prior theoretical and empirical studies (Adams, 2002; Fifka, 2013; Gray
et al., 1995; Harjoto & Jo, 2011), we predict that the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) is likely to
be determined by the seven CG variables (i.e., block shareholding— BSHARE; board size—
BSIZE, CG index — CGI, board gender diversity — GDIV, government shareholding —
GSHARE, independent NEDs — INED, and institutional shareholding — ISHARE) and 12
control variables (i.e., audit firm size — AFSIZ, capital expenditure — CAPEX, country
dummies — COUD, industry dummies — DIND, year dummies — DYED, dual-listing —
DLIST, firm size — FSIZE, gearing — GEAR, CG committee — GOVCO, sales growth —
GROTH, risk — RISK, and social and environmental accounting committee — SEACO). In
stage 2, the predicted part of the CHA disclosure index (P_CHADI) is used as an instrument for
the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) with Eq. (2) re-run in the following form:
FV it ¼ α0 þ β^1CHAit þ
Xn
i¼1
β iCONTROLSit þ γi þ εit ð4Þ
in which every specification is unchanged as in Eq. (2), apart from using the predicted CHA
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disclosure index (CHADI) in Eq. (4). The findings contained in Model 7 of Table 7 relating to
the predicted CHA disclosure index (P_CHADI) and CHA disclosure index interacted with the
CG index (M ∗ CGI) indicate that the CHA disclosure index (CHADI) remains positively and
significantly related to FV (TBQ), implying that our evidence appears to be insensitive to
possible endogeneity problems that may be due to omitted variables.
Finally, to ascertain whether our findings are sensitive to the FV proxy used, operating
return on assets (OROA, a financial accounting-related measure) and the total return of a
company's listed share (TRS, a stock market-related proxy) are used in re-estimating Eq. (2).
The findings contained in Models 8 and 9 of Table 7 for OROA and TRS, respectively, are
in the main similar to those reported in Models 3 to 7 of the same table, implying that our
evidence appears to be insensitive to the type of FV proxy used. In sum, our extra
empirical investigations make us reasonably confident that the findings do not suffer
from any major endogeneity problems, and they are not sensitive to alternative CG,
CHA, and FV proxies.
7. Summary and conclusions
The effect of corporate governance (CG) on firm value (FV) has been investigated by a
number of past studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Gompers et al., 2003;
Renders et al., 2010; Ntim, Opong and Danbolt, 2012). Some have also investigated the
impact of traditional social and environmental accounting (SEA) practices on FV (Cai
et al., 2012; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; McGuire et al., 1988; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000;
Orlitzky et al., 2003), whereas others have explored the relationship between a number of
traditional firm-level factors (e.g., company size, profitability, and industrial sector) and
SEA disclosures (Barbu et al., 2014a; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Fifka, 2013; Gray et al.,
1995; Reverte, 2009; Roberts, 1992; Williams, 1999; Al-Bassam et al., forthcoming).
However, despite theoretical suggestions that the decision to engage in SEA practices is
often driven by corporate boards and top management, prior evidence on how and why CG
can drive a firm's corporate health accounting (CHA) practices, and consequently, how
and why CG might moderate the CHA–FV nexus, is rare (Crifo & Forget, 2015;
Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). Further, the few existing studies that have examined the
connections among SEA, CG, and FV have also focused mainly on conventional SEA
disclosures (Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b),
with virtually no evidence on CHA relating to major global health crises, such as
Alzheimer's, cancer, dementia, Ebola, HIV/AIDs, malaria, and tuberculosis. As a result,
current international understanding of how and why a corporation's governance
mechanisms may influence its CHA orientation and consequently, how and why CG
might moderate the FV-CHA nexus, is limited. This study, thus, investigates the important
subject of how and why a corporation's internal governance structures may be related to its
CHA disclosures and consequently, whether CG can moderate the association between the
CHA practices and FV with specific focus on the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI)’s,
2003 guidance on HIV/AIDS disclosures in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where HIV/AIDS
prevalence rate is comparatively high and thus serves as a significant challenge to
corporate profitability, economic growth, and development.
Table 7
The impact of corporate health accounting disclosures on firm value.
Dependent variables
Indep. variables TBQ TBQ TBQ TBQ TBQ Lagged (TBQ) IV (TBQ) OROA TRS
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Corporate health accounting (CHA) variables
CHADI 0.028 – 0.123** 0.144*** 0.137*** 0.126*** – 0.153*** 0.130***
(0.195) – (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) – (0.000) (0.000)
CHADW – 0.032 – – – – – – –
(0.182) – – – – – – –
P_CHADI – – – – – – 0.165*** – –
– – – – – – (0.000) – –
Moderation variables
Corporate governance index
M*CGI – – 0.180*** – 0.186*** 0.160*** 0.198*** 0.193*** 0.136***
– – (0.000) – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Alternative CG variables — shareholding variables
M ∗ BSHARE – – – −0.045 −0.019 −0.040 – −0.065 −0.030
– – – (0.308) (0.406) (0.318) – (0.124) (0.353)
M ∗ GSHARE – – – 0.175*** 0.186*** 0.166*** – 0.133*** 0.129***
– – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) – (0.000) (0.010)
M ∗ ISHARE – – – −0.043 −0.035 −0.030 – −0.054 −0.037
– – – (0.297) (0.367) (0.416) – (0.235) (0.380)
Alternative CG variables— board variables
M ∗ GDIV – – – 0.180*** 0.188*** 0.160*** – 0.182*** 0.147***
– – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) – (0.000) (0.000)
M ∗ BSIZE – – – 0.044 0.049 0.035 – 0.060 0.030

















M ∗ INED – – – 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.108** – 0.140*** 0.146***
– – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) – (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables — firm-level characteristics
AFSIZ 0.175*** 0.183*** 0.176*** 0.160*** 0.178*** 0.163*** 0.192*** 0.004 0.125**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.889) (0.014)
CAPEX −0.043 −0.027 −0.046 −0.025 −0.058 −0.026 −0.058 −0.160*** −0.024
(0.200) (0.440) (0.218) (0.468) (0.197) (0.480) (0.180) (0.000) (0.480)
GOVCO 0.030 0.045 0.038 0.059 0.048 0.045 0.062 0.020 0.031
(0.410) (0.198) (0.367) (0.197) (0.200) (0.214) (0.176) (0.380) (0.392)
DLIST 0.156*** 0.148*** 0.162*** 0.175*** 0.183*** 0.169*** 0.200*** 0.041 0.157***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.295) (0.000)
GEAR −0.030 −0.026 −0.025 −0.030 −0.042 −0.023 −0.054 −0.148*** −0.026
(0.332) (0.445) (0.466) (0.403) (0.292) (0.473) (0.261) (0.000) (0.470)
FSIZE −0.146*** −0.168*** −0.198*** −0.179*** −0.185*** −0.160*** −0.216*** −0.292*** −0.146***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RISK 0.163*** 0.125*** 0.167*** 0.130*** 0.147*** 0.138*** 0.187*** 0.198*** 0.135***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GROTH 0.230*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.197*** 0.216*** 0.178*** 0.234*** 0.160*** 0.167
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Own/board – – CGI Own/board Yes Yes CGI Yes Yes
DIND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DYED Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
COUD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.728*** 0.789*** 0.726*** 0.597*** 0.580*** 0.549*** 0.746*** 0.754*** − .096
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.986)
Durbin–W. 2.018 2.020 2.185 2.197 2.218 2.194 2.014 2.210 2.013
F-value 8.302*** 8.343*** 8.786*** 9.264*** 9.790*** 8.887*** 8.974*** 9.548*** 7.894***
Adj. R2 0.465 0.470 0.475 0.483 0.506 0.478 0.479 0.494 0.418
N 500 500 500 500 500 400 500 500 500
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and

















192 Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216Aside from articulating and applying a legitimacy theoretical framework that can be
used to interpret CHA practices generally, the results of this study make new contributions
to the international CG and SEA literature in a several ways. Employing one of the largest
datasets to be used in recent times on CHA, CG, and FV, our study offers new evidence
indicating that firms with good CG arrangements tend to show greater commitment to good
CHA practices through increased CHA disclosures. Noticeably, there are some limited but
observable differences in the link between the summary CHA disclosure measure and CG
on the one hand, and the sub-CHA disclosure categories and CG on the other hand,
suggesting that firms may attach different importance to different CHA activities. Our
study thus contributes to a small but gradually growing body of literature that examines the
link between quality CG indices and SEA practices (e.g., Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011;
Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Tunyi & Ntim,
2016). Second (although not the central focus of the study), our findings contribute to the
literature by suggesting that firms with high shareholding by blockholders and institutions
disclose less on their CHA practices, but companies with high shareholding by government,
high proportion of women directors, large number of directors, and more independent,
non-executive directors disclose more on their CHA practices. These results are mainly in line
with the expectations of our conceptual framework that attempts to combine Suchman's
(1995) legitimacy framework with Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) substantive versus symbolic
legitimacy management strategies.
Third, although the results of a good number of previous research that directly
investigated the CHA–FV nexus have been mixed, efforts at explaining how and why this
might be the case are limited. Therefore, the current study makes a new and distinctive
contribution to the international literature by showing that a firm's internal governance
structures have a significant moderating impact on the association between CHA and FV.
The theoretical and methodological implication of our evidence is that the effect of CHA
on FV is stronger when it is combined with CG than on its own. Empirically, our evidence
offers a new important insight on, and expansion of, the efforts at explaining the
conflicting results of previous research that has investigated direct links between CHA and
FV. The central tenor of our results remains insensitive to a number of potential
endogeneity problems and different CHA, CG, and FV measures.
Fourth, the results have important policy, practitioner, and regulatory implications,
particularly for managers of large public corporations, national governments, and
transnational/supranational bodies, such as the World Health Organization, who are
interested in eradicating major global health challenges, such as those relating to the global
fight against Alzheimer's, cancer, dementia, Ebola, malaria, and tuberculosis. In terms of
national regulatory bodies, governments, and transnational/supranational bodies, our
evidence provides them with strong impetus to embark upon CG policy reforms alongside
initiatives that will improve corporate CHA practices. In particular, efforts at improving
financial aspects of CG relating to corporate boards and directors' behavior, sound
financial management, and accountability for holders of corporate shares can be
embarked on jointly with attempts at resolving pressing issues of relevance to other
stakeholders (e.g., labor unions, consumers, and local communities) relating to the
environment, health and safety, and ethics. With specific reference to companies, since our
evidence indicates that CG and CHA practices can have a joint positive effect on FV, our
193Ntim C. / The International Journal of Accounting 51 (2016) 155–216study offers senior corporate managers the motivation to capture CHA as an important part
of their corporations' broader CG practices by paying attention to pressing CHA issues of
their stakeholders.
Finally, whereas our findings are relevant and robust, some caveats are in order. First, the
CHA and CG data were manually collected, which required a lot of commitment in terms of
time and thus limited our focus to a sample of SSA companies and HIV/AIDS. Future studies
may utilize our theoretical framework to analyze how corporations can, for example, contribute
towards addressing other major global health challenges, such as Alzheimer's, cancer, and
dementia, which are more prevalent in Europe, North America, and other developed countries,
or Ebola, which is endemic in SSA countries but has recently become a major global health
crisis. Second, in line with previous studies, firms in the utility and financial industries were
excluded from the final sample; fresh views can be gained by examining such unique
corporations. Third, although our CHA indices are quality-oriented/weighted, we also employ
binary indices and word counts as our proxies for CHA and CG with well-articulated
limitations (e.g., Deegan, 2002; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011; Parker, 2005; Unerman, 2000).
While the findings obtained by using the quality- and quantity-oriented CHA proxies appear to
be largely the same, in the future, researchers may improve their analysis by employing
alternative CHA and CG proxies (e.g., number of pages/sentences counted and weighted CG
indices). Fourth, as a result of data constraints, the empirical investigation is limited to internal
governance structures. In the future, researchers may be able to offer new insights by
examining how and why external governance mechanisms, including the law, national culture,
politics, and market forces (i.e., for managers and corporations) might influence the CHA
practices. Finally, our variables used as proxies for CG, CHA, and FV may or may not
capture how corporate boards, managers, and owners behave in practice. For example,
and in line with similar previous SEA studies (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Cai et al.,
2012; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Hillman et al., 2001; Harjoto &
Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012), we have assumed
that CHA disclosures (‘what firms say they do’) may be a good proxy for their CHA
performance (‘what firms actually do’). However, several prior studies suggest that SEA
disclosures often tend to be different from SEA performance (Adams, 2004; Beattie &
Jones, 2000; Beck et al., 2010; Berthelot, Cormier, & Magnan, 2003; Cho et al., 2012a,
2012b; Cho, Lee, & Pfeiffer, 2013; Rockness, 1985; Tom, 2002; Wiseman, 1982). For
example, and using a cross-sectional sample of 92 U.S. firms, Cho et al. (2012a) report
that firms with poor environmental performance engage in increased voluntary environ-
mental disclosures. They also report that firms with poor environmental performance tended
to have high environmental reputation and were often members of the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index, suggesting that such firms use voluntary environmental disclosures
to mediate the effect of their poor environmental performance. Like all prior archival
studies, our reported cross-sectional associations should, therefore, be interpreted with
some level of caution, especially without necessarily assuming or inferring the presence
of causality relationships. As suggested by our anonymous reviewers, one way of
addressing this is to conduct in-depth interviews with corporate decision-makers, such as
senior managers, directors, and owners. Thus, useful insights may be offered by future
studies by conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors, and owners
regarding these issues.
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Corporate health accounting (CHA) practice disclosure index based on the 2003 GRI reporting guidance of HIV/AIDSGRI CHA theme Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) CHA item:
information on or reference toRange
of scoresTotal score
per theme(i). Good governance 1. Disclosure of, and reference to, the
organization's HIV/AIDS policy (Policy).0–6 902. Disclosure of information on policy meeting
codes of conduct and laws.0–63. Information on partnerships beyond the
workplace (with specific stakeholders).0–64. Reference to an overall strategy for
managing the HIV/AIDS risk (Strategy).0–65. Disclosure and elaboration of internal and/or
external risks.0–66. Disclosure of additional explanation on how
the policy/strategies are communicated.0–67. Disclosure of the extent of preparedness and
contingency planning in anticipation of
expected HIV/AIDS impacts (Contingency).0–68. Disclosure of information on contingency
plan for employees/labor.0–69. Disclosure of information on contingency
plans for markets and/or suppliers0–610. Disclosure that mentions that the
organization monitors its progress and reports
in terms of meeting strategies, policies, or
targets set out from 1 to 3 above (Monitoring).0–611. Disclosure of information on how the policy,
strategy and targets are reviewed or evaluated.0–612. Disclosure of external bodies/constituencies
to whom the company reports.0–613. Disclosure that mentions that the organization
involves stakeholders in the formulation of policy,
strategy, and implementation (Stakeholder).0–614. Disclosure of specific stakeholder groups
(and representative).0–615. Disclosure of information on how stakeholders
are involved in HIV/AIDs supported structures
and budget setting.0–6(ii). Measurement, monitoring,
and evaluation16. Disclosure of current (or most recent) HIV/
AIDS prevalence and/or incidence rates among
relevant populations (e.g., at employee level).
(Prevalence).0–6 5417. Disclosure of evidence to enable an
assessment of the reliability of prevalence rates.0–618. Disclosure of information on future
(projections) prevalence and/or incidence rates.0–619. Disclosure of information on current HIV/
AIDS-associated costs and losses (Current costs).0–6
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Corporate health accounting (CHA) practice disclosure index based on the 2003 GRI reporting guidance of HIV/AIDS
Appendix 1 (continued)GRI CHA theme(ii). Measurement, monitoring,
and evaluationGlobal Reporting Initiative (GRI) CHA item:
information on or reference toRange
of scoresTotal score
per theme20. Disclosure of the methods and/or assumptions
used to calculate current costs/losses.0–621.Disclosure of the breakdownof costs and losses. 0–6
22. Disclosure of the total assumed future HIV/
AIDS-associated costs and losses. (Future costs).0–623. Disclosure of the models and/or assumptions
used to calculate future costs/losses.0–624. Disclosure of the breakdown of future costs
and losses.0–6(iii). Workplace conditions and
HIV/AIDS management25. Disclosure of a workplace or workplace-
related HIV/AIDS programs and interventions.
(Program).0–6 3626. Disclosure of explicit assurance regarding
confidentiality and non-discrimination.0–627. Disclosure of grievance and discrimination
procedures available to employees.0–628. Report of total allocated budget dedicated
to HIV/AIDS programs per annum. (Budget).0–629. Disclosure of the breakdown of budget per
program.0–630. Disclosure of further information on the
budget/funding sources for the programs.0–6(iv). Depth, quality, and
sustainability of programs31. Disclosure of the organization's Voluntary
Counseling and Testing (VCT) program.0–6 12032. Disclosure of information on how program
is administered to preserve confidentiality and
ensure non-discrimination. (VCT).0–633. Disclosure of proportion of staff utilizing
VCT programs (and/or any quantitative mea-
sure of VCT outcomes).0–634. Disclosure of other support and counseling
programs for affected groups. (Support).0–635. Disclosure of the details of the available
support groups.0–636. Disclosure of the quality of support
(e.g., trained counselors and peer educators).0–637. Disclosure of the organization's HIV/AIDS
education and training programs. (Education).0–638. Detailed disclosure of the nature of the
educational programs.0–639. Disclosure of how education and training is
assessed for effectiveness.0–640. Disclosure of the organization's condom and
femidom distribution programs. (Contraception).0–641. Disclosure of educational programs and/or
communications used to encourage the use of
contraception.0–6(continued on next page)
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Corporate health accounting (CHA) practice disclosure index based on the 2003 GRI reporting guidance of HIV/AIDS
Appendix 1 (continued)GRI CHA theme(iv). Depth, quality, and
sustainability of programsGlobal Reporting Initiative (GRI) CHA item:
information on or reference toRange
of scoresTotal score
per theme42. Disclosure of practical actions on making
contraception available to workers.0–643. Disclosure of the organization's general
healthcare and wellness provision for employees
and/or their families. (Healthcare).0–644. Disclosure of the nature of healthcare
provision (Provider and provision of anti-
retroviral treatment — ART).0–645. Disclosure of preventative measures —
including STD treatment.0–646. Disclosure of care provision made available
to families.0–647. Disclosure of proportion of employees
receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART).0–648. Disclosure of additional benefits and support
for employees sick, dying, or deceased from
AIDS-related conditions. (Benefits).0–649. Disclosure of benefits (retirement and work
re-deployment) to employee.0–650. Disclosure of available family support
(financial and offering work or other).0–6Total 50 CHA disclosure items 300
Scoring procedure
0: No disclosure.
1: Disclosure focusing on only past/backward looking information.
2: Disclosure focusing on past/backward looking and future/forward-looking information.
3: Disclosure focusing on past/backward looking, future/forward looking, and bad/negative news information.
4: Disclosure focusing on past/backward looking, future/forward looking, bad/negative, and good/positive news
information.
5: Disclosure focusing on past, future/forward looking, bad/negative, good/positive, and qualitative/non-monetary
information.
6: Disclosure focusing on past/historical, future, bad/negative, good/positive, qualitative, and quantitative/monetary
information.




(i). Director and board 1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/
MD are split.
0–1 37
2. Whether the chairperson of the board is an
independent, non-executive director.
0–1
3. Whether the board is composed by a
majority of non-executive directors (NEDs).
0–1
4. Whether the board meets at least four times
in a year.
0–1
5. Whether individual directors' meetings
record is disclosed.
0–1
6. Whether the remit of the board of directors
is disclosed.
0–1
7. Whether directors are clearly classified into
executive, NED, and independent.
0–1
8. Whether chairperson's performance and
effectiveness are evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
9. Whether CEO/MD's performance and
effectiveness are appraised and disclosed.
0–1
10. Whether the board's performance and
effectiveness are evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
11. Whether directors' biography, experience,
and responsibilities are disclosed.
0–1
12. Whether a narrative relating to policy on
achieving sufficient diversity and size of the
board is disclosed.
0–1
13. The existence of a well-resourced office of
company secretary held by suitably qualified
and competent professional person.
0–1
14. Whether a nomination committee has been
established.
0–1
15. Whether the nomination committee consists
of a majority of independent NEDs.
0–1
16. Whether performance of the nomination
committee is evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
17. Whether the remit of the nomination
committee is disclosed.
0–1
18. Whether the chairperson of the nomination
committee is an independent NED.
0–1
19.Whether the membership of the nomination
committee is disclosed.
0–1
20. Whether the nomination committee
members'meeting attendance record is disclosed.
0–1
21. Whether a remuneration committee has
been established.
0–1
22. Whether the remuneration committee is
constituted entirely by independent NEDs.
0–1
(continued on next page)
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23. Whether the remit of the remuneration
committee is disclosed.
0–1
24.Whether the chairperson of the remuneration
committee is an independent NED.
0–1
25. Whether the remuneration committee
performance is evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
26. Whether the membership of the
remuneration committee is disclosed.
0–1
27. Whether the remuneration committee
members' meetings attendance record is
disclosed.
0–1
28. Whether the remuneration committee
meets at least 4 times in a year.
0–1
29. Whether the nomination committee meets
at least 4 times in a year.
0–1
30. Whether directors have access to free
independent professional legal advice.
0–1
31. Whether a narrative stating the commitment
to ensuring that the board and its committees
have the appropriate balance of skills,
experience, independence, and knowledge of
the company is disclosed.
0–1
32. Whether a narrative on the board charter/
remit, roles, and responsibilities in discharging
its fiduciary and leadership duties is disclosed.
0–1
33. Whether a narrative relating to director
induction, training, and continuous personal
development plans is disclosed.
0–1
34. Whether the performance of the company
secretary is evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
35.Whether the performance of individual board
members or directors is evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
36. Whether a policy on the staggered
appointment and rotation of directors is disclosed.
0–1
37. Whether a policy of multiple and alternate




38. Whether the audit committee is constituted
by at least 2 independent NEDs.
0–1 26
39. Whether a narrative on the existence and
implementation of a well-developed code of
ethics and conduct is disclosed.
0–1
40. Whether a narrative on a robust whistle-
blowing process and protection to whistle-
blowers is disclosed.
0–1
41. Whether company financial statements and
performance are properly prepared, presented,
and reported.
0–1
42. Whether the policy on the appointment
and rotation of auditors is disclosed.
0–1
(i). Director and board
Appendix 2 (continued)
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43.Whether a narrative on annual evaluation of
the effectiveness of the risk management and
governance strategy and policy is disclosed.
0–1
44. Whether a narrative on annual evaluation of
the effectiveness ofmanagement and governance
of internal control and audit systems is disclosed.
0–1
45. Whether a policy on ensuring timely and
balanced disclosure of all material information
concerning the company is disclosed.
0–1
46. Whether the audit committee is formed by
at least 3 independent non-executive directors.
47. Whether the chairperson of the audit
committee is an independent NED.
0–1
48. Whether the remit of the audit committee
is disclosed.
49. Whether the membership of the audit
committee is disclosed.
0–1
50. Whether the audit committee members'
meeting attendance record is disclosed.
0–1
51. Whether a board statement on the ongoing-
concern status of the firm is disclosed.
0–1
52. Whether share ownership by all insiders,
including directors, officers, employees, and
employees' trust is less than 50% of the total
company shareholdings.
0–1
53. Whether the audit committee has at least
one member with relevant financial training
and experience.
0–1
54. Whether the audit committee performance
is evaluated and disclosed.
0–1
55. Whether an audit committee has been
established.
0–1
56. Whether directors' remuneration, interests,
and share options are disclosed.
0–1
57. Whether director remuneration philosophy
and procedure are disclosed.
0–1
58. Whether a narrative on related party
transactions are disclosed.
0–1
59. Whether a policy that prohibits director,
officer, and employee (insider) share dealings
around the release of price-sensitive informa-
tion is disclosed.
0–1
60. Whether the audit committee meets at
least 4 times in a year.
0–1
61. Whether a narrative regarding the existence
of adequate procedures, policies, and processes
of appointing and disengaging external auditors
is disclosed.
0–1
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62. Whether a narrative relating to annual
financial performance is disclosed.
0–1
63. Whether a narrative relating to the review
of corporate operations is disclosed.
0–1
(iii). Internal audit, risk
management, and control
64. Whether the risk committee members'
meeting attendance record is disclosed.
0–1 12
65. Whether membership of the risk committee
is disclosed.
0–1
66. Whether the remit of the risk committee is
disclosed.
0–1
67. Whether a narrative on both actual and
potential future systematic and non-systematic
risks is disclosed.
0–1
68. Whether a narrative on existing internal
control systems (including internal audit) is
disclosed.
0–1
69. Whether a narrative on how current and
future assessed company risks will be managed
is disclosed.
0–1
70. Whether a risk management committee
has been established.
0–1
71. Whether risk management committee
meets at least 4 times in a year.
0–1
72. Whether the risk management committee's
membership consist of executive, non-executive,
and independent, non-executive directors.
0–1
73. Whether a narrative relating to risk
management and governance strategy and
policy is disclosed.
0–1
74.Whether a narrative relating to management
and governance internal control and audit
systems is disclosed.
0–1





76. Whether a narrative on how a firm is
contributing towards the development of
financial journalism is disclosed.
0–1 13
77. Whether a narrative on what a firm is doing
to encourage shareholder activism, like having
investor relations department and proxy voting,
is disclosed.
0–1
78. Whether a positive statement on the
compliance or non-compliance with the relevant
national code of corporate governance is disclosed.
0–1
79. Whether a narrative on one-share-one-
vote is disclosed.
0–1
80. Whether a narrative on shareholders' right
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81. Whether a narrative on shareholders' right
to have say-on-pay is disclosed.
0–1
82. Whether a narrative on shareholders' right
to receive copy of annual reports and relevant
company reports and communications is
disclosed.
0–1
83. Whether a narrative on shareholders' right
to receive dividends and residual income
arising from any liquidation is disclosed.
0–1
84. Whether a narrative on ensuring that all
shareholders are treated equally is disclosed.
0–1
85. Whether a narrative on whether shareholders
have the right to receive relevant and timely
information concerning the date, location, and
agenda of the annual general meetings is
disclosed.
0–1
86. Whether a narrative of the right of
shareholders to call extraordinary meetings
is disclosed.
0–1
87. Whether a narrative regarding the use of
modern means of communication such as
websites, e-mails, teleconferencing, and vid-
eoconferencing to communicate effectively
and timely with shareholders is disclosed.
0–1
88.Whether a narrative relating to shareholders'
right to a secure method of sale, transfer, and
registration of share ownership is disclosed.
0–1
Total 88 CG provisions 88
Scoring procedure
0: Not disclosed or absent.
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Appendix 3. Specific examples of corporate health accounting disclosures in corporate annual reports and application of the
coding rules
Firm name Examples of HIV/AIDs disclosures in
corporate annual reports
HIV disclosure category/major HIV disclosure sub-category(ies) Classification/coding
Turnall Holdings
(Zimba-bwe)
“The Group employs policies appropriate to the
business and markets meant to attract, retain and
motivate the quality of staff through training,
development, information sharing and
progressive cooperation. The Group provides
equal opportunities, without discriminating
against gender, race, physical ability or HIV/
AIDS status. The Group continues to enhance
and apply its HIV/AIDS policy adopted in 2010.
Our HIV/AIDS policy commits the Group to
maintain confidentiality over status, provide
education and awareness, provide counseling,
prevent spreading and promote safe sex.” Turnall







“The South African operations have adopted a
comprehensive HIV and AIDS awareness pro-
gram. Altogether 94% of employees underwent
training in South Africa, 100% in both Namibia
and Swaziland. As a result of this training, 85%
of employees attended voluntary counseling and
testing sessions on site (up from 68.5% in 2008)
and 99% in both Swaziland and Namibia. The
current prevalence rate is below that reported by
other manufacturing companies and employees
are continuously encouraged to come forward for

























“Efforts in developing partnerships for developing
health at work and in the community received
accolades in Uganda, where Hima Cement won an
award from the USAID sponsored Health initia-
tive for the private sector (HIPS) for having a
comprehensive medical scheme, a health and HIV
policy, a successful peer education program and an
outstanding sensitization program on HIV/AIDS,
Family Planning, Malaria and Sexually Transmit-
ted Infections. …In August 2011 Hima Cement
held its monthly outreach sensitization project at
Nyakakindo whose goal was to educate the
community on safe male circumcision. The
stakeholder team also held a community health
outreach day at Rugendabara to address issues
couples face in HIV/AIDS. In both campaigns the
company provided free counseling& testing, male
circumcision and education on family planning.…
USAID Award - comprehensive medical scheme,
health & HIV policy, successful peer education
and health promotional programs.” Bamburi









“On world Aids Day, 1st December 2009,
voluntary counseling and testing was provided
for employees. Holy Trinity Health Centre was
the service provider. ABL joined the Ghana
Business Coalition against HIV/Aids in the
2008/2009 financial year. The Ghana Business
Coalition against HIV/Aids (GhBCA) has
among its mandate the following: facilitate
workplace programs by providing guidelines,
strategies and technical resources; coordinate
the implementation of workplace HIV/AIDS

























Firm name Examples of HIV/AIDs disclosures in
corporate annual reports
HIV disclosure category/major HIV disclosure sub-category(ies) Classification/coding
enroll and mobilize companies to join the
Coalition; mobilize resources for the business
sector response to HIV/AIDS; build capacity of
businesses through research, training &
mentoring, monitoring, and evaluation; create
a platform for sharing best practices and
knowledge; create a database of workplace
HIV/AIDS programs and policies; and advo-
cate workplace HIV/AIDS-related issues and
contribute to the achievement of national HIV/
AIDS response targets. ABL has so far
benefited from several training programs orga-
nized by the GhBCA for peer educators.”
Accra Brewery (2009, p. 6)
UAC (Nigeria) “Our company works to ensure a safe healthy
working environment by providing basic HIV/
AIDS training to inform, educate and train all
employees about HIV/Aids prevention, care
and control. We do not discriminate against or
dismiss any employee on the basis of his or her
HIV status. The HIV status and medical
records of any individual will be considered
and kept as strictly confidential. As much as
possible care will be taken to support such
individuals by providing counseling and med-










“It is estimated that the HIV/AIDS prevalence
levels among employees at the South African
operations in 2007 remained stable at around
30% of the workforce. Key objectives of the





























risk of HIV/AIDS on the company and its
employees by reducing and ultimately
eliminating new infections, efficiently managing
those infected and supporting those with advanced
AIDS. The program focuses on prevention of
HIV, by means of various workplace initiatives,
including voluntary counseling and testing (VCT).
Assuming single testing, around 102% of the
South African workforce was tested in 2007
(2006: 75%). Treatment programs, which involve
the clinical care of those infected by the virus,
including the use of anti-retroviral therapy (ART).
ART is available to all employees at all our
operations in Africa, either directly from company
facilities, through company-sponsored or -funded
facilities, or from state facilities. Support for the
AIDS-ill requiring separation from the company
and palliative care, including support for various
community initiatives. Total expenditure on the
company's HIV/AIDS program in South Africa
amounted to approximately R25.2 million
($3.6 million) in 2007 (2006: R21.5 million;
$3.2 million).…Not only does the disease result in
death, illness and absenteeism among employees,
but it is a major cause of death in young children
and pregnant women, with an obvious effect on
employees' families and communities.” Anglo
Gold Ashanti (2007, pp. 51–52)
Gold Fields
(South Africa)
“…Approximately 30% of employees in the
South Africa Region are HIV positive. This is a
significant concern as it negatively impacts on
life, safety and productivity. Gold Fields has an
extensive and well-developed program to





























Firm name Examples of HIV/AIDs disclosures in
corporate annual reports
HIV disclosure category/major HIV disclosure sub-category(ies) Classification/coding
employees. A central part of this program is the
provision of anti-retroviral treatment (ART) to
employees with AIDS. During 2009, 941 new
employees started treatment, which brings the
total number of employees on the program to
2235. Only 6% of employees enrolled on the
program have been forced to withdraw due to
non-adherence to the program. …The deaths in
service due to medical reasons (of which HIV
is one) has decreased from 10 per 1000 in
F2006 to 5.61 per 1000 for F2009, pointing to
improvements in the accessibility of healthcare
services to more employees. In addition,
ill-health retirements have increased from 25
per 1000 in F2008 to 29 per 1000 in F2009. …
Informed, Consent, Voluntary Counseling and
Testing (ICVCT) is a core part of the HIV/Aids
program, and a significant contributor to the
prevention of HIV infection. A total of 39% of
all employees in the South Africa Region have
been tested. Southern Africa HIV therapeutic
vaccine project - Gold Fields has contributed
US$600,000 towards the Southern African
HIV Therapeutic Vaccine Project. This collab-
orative strategic HIV/Aids health initiative is
aimed at advancing therapeutic vaccine clinical
trials within Southern Africa. The Virax
vaccine technology and the related project
proposal have been extensively discussed with
leading HIV experts in South Africa and are




















vaccine to provide an effective early therapeutic
intervention, potentially delaying the require-
ment to start ART by some years. The research
project has received final South African Medi-
cines Control Council approval and the clinical
trial commenced in October 2008. The trial
involves recruiting 140 HIV positive participants
from four well established HIV/Aids clinics
across four provinces in South Africa. Progress
has been good with the number of participants
enrolled rising to 58 as at June 2009.” Gold
Fields (2009, pp. 63–64, 73–74, 84–85)
Guinness Ghana
(Ghana)
“Your company has continued to engage
employees around HIV/AIDS awareness, and
this year the Human Resources department as
well as the Corporate department continued to
play a key role in supporting the Ghana Business
Coalition Against HIV/Aids (GBCA) in
spreading our best practice of an HIV/Aids work
program to other companies in Ghana.”









“The Company has a comprehensive HIV/Aids
policy and supports HIV/Aids patients and their
familieswith free anti-retroviral drugs and counsel-
ing. Further, the Company supports the prevention
of mother to child transmission of HIV/Aids
through its appointed medical care givers. More
than 1150 staff underwent HIV/Aids awareness
training during the year under review, and more
than 450 were trained on drug and substance
abuse.” Kenya Power and Lighting (2011, p. 31)





“…The Group is strategically positioned to deal
with HIV and AIDS issues through the HIV
and AIDS policy and the implementation of
Good governance Awareness/policy/support Past/qualitative/positive/
non-monetary
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programs under the policy such as enhanced
appreciation to know one's status, greater access
to medication as well as support structures for the
affected employees. …The Group provided
medical aid cover, medical, recreational and
nutritional facilities in a wellness program
designed to have a healthy workforce for
enhanced productivity. The Group is committed
to building a healthy workforce operating in a
hazard free environment …by carrying out
awareness training programs on HIV/Aids
targeted at all employees.” Dairibord Holdings
(2011, p. 5, 21–22)
Cadbury (Nigeria) “…Examples of this direct CSR involvement
have been mostly in education and health
awareness activities, especially HIV/AIDS.
HIV/AIDS - we have a robust work place
program for ensuring that employees are fully
informed about the scourge of this disease,
including causes and prevention. Our document-
ed policy statement is widely circulated among
employees, guaranteeing absolute confidentiality
and forbidding any form of discrimination.
Disclosures may only be made with the consent
of the employee, and hotlines are provided for
those who desire more counseling in complete
anonymity. …The trained volunteer steering
committee members organize frequent activities.
Slogans designed by employees and reminders
through various means, including prints on































awareness level top of mind. …As part of our
community engagement program, we are work-
ing with the local community to design commu-
nication and awareness programs. In this we are
glad to note that the national prevalence rate has
dropped from 5.8% to 4.4% due to the
collaborative efforts of government and the
business community.” Cadbury Nigeria (2005,
pp. 6, 24, 33)
Barlo-world
(South Africa)
“Our employees in southern Africa are
encouraged to know their HIV status through
confidential VCT. People living with HIV/Aids
can access ART medication from their medical
aid, company-sponsored program or the state. In
South Africa, approximately 6500 employees
participated in “Know your Status” campaigns at
80 sites during the past 18 months, with an 85%
response rate. 6.1% of these participants are HIV
positive. The prevalence among our employees in
other southern African countries varies between
5% and 20% as determined by anonymous testing
or “Know your Status” campaigns. R2million has
been spent during the past two years on
prevention initiatives, anonymous testing and
“Know your Status” campaigns. Twenty-five
employees were placed on ill-health retirement
or died as a result of Aids-related conditions.
There were no cases in the managerial, executive
or professional category, seven in the skilled
category, 16 in the semi-skilled category and two
in the unskilled category. This equates to a staff
turnover of 0.35% of employees per annum,
down from 0.56% in 2004. This reduction is
attributed to the greater use of ART medication.”
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